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Decoupling Taxes and Marriage: Beyond Innocence 
and Income Splitting 
 
 




Fourteen years ago, members of Congress sympathetically listened as 
divorcees testified to their struggles to raise children while being pursued by the 
Internal Revenue Service for tax debts, often unknown to them, that were 
attributable to their ex-husbands' income.  Rather than adopting one of many 
proposals to end joint and several liability, Congress instead elected to expand 
the grounds on which these individuals could seek relief from such liability.  Since 
that time, taxpayers have seen a steady expansion of the grounds for so-called 
“innocent spouse relief” that has evolved through a combination of legislative, 
administrative, and judicial action.  Yet the process for relief remains time-
consuming, inefficient, and unpredictable.  The majority of initial requests for 
innocent spouse relief are denied.  The taxpayer can appeal administratively and 
also seek judicial review if relief is denied, but sometimes will spend several years 
and untold resources in pursuit of a claim that may ultimately be unsuccessful.  
The process is also a questionable use of Internal Revenue Service personnel, in 
that it frequently calls upon these employees to address the most intimate aspects 
of a failed relationship, including spousal abuse, addictions, and mental health 
problems.  These employees often must make a determination based upon a “he-
said, she-said” presentation of the facts—an odd task for an agency charged with 
enforcing the revenue laws. 
 This article visits the historic rationales for joint and several liability, both 
in light of the flawed relief process and also in the context of modern-day 
American society, in which married couples constitute only half of all households 
and cohabitation is increasingly more common.  I conclude that Congress should 
eliminate the “married” filing statuses and require each married individual to file 
a separate return.  If it did so, joint liability and the innocent spouse relief 
process would both cease to exist.  The historical policy justifications for 
imposing joint and several liability are no longer rational in light of changed 
demographics and technological advances.  Rather than an “unusual privilege,” 
which it was long said to be, filing jointly has become a risky conundrum, 
particularly for low-income taxpayers.  As the nation debates tax reform, it is 
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appropriate to rethink the policy of retaining the “married” filing statuses in light 
of the ways in which family structures, society, and the Internal Revenue Code 
have changed since joint and several liability was introduced in 1938. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
Married taxpayers have two options when filing a federal income tax return:  (1) 
file a joint return, in which case the taxpayers agree to joint and several liability for any 
tax due;1 or (2) file separate returns by electing the “married filing separately” status.  It 
is estimated that joint returns typically comprise ninety-five percent of the income tax 
returns filed by married taxpayers.2  The Internal Revenue Code (“Code”) does not favor 
married taxpayers who file separately; except in very unusual circumstances,3 these 
taxpayers will face a higher tax liability by choosing this filing status.4  Thus, it is almost 
always in a married couple’s collective financial interest to file a joint return.  However, 
if the couple files jointly and then later divorces, the Internal Revenue Service 
(“Service”) can pursue collection efforts for the joint years against either or both 
taxpayers simultaneously, regardless of which spouse’s income created the liability.    
One of the simplest and most automated types of collection activity is the refund 
offset: the Service will apply an income tax refund expected from one year (in whole or 
in part) to satisfy an outstanding tax liability from a different year.5  Thus, in many cases 
involving divorced couples with minor children, the Service will seize the sizable 
refundable tax credits due to the low-to-middle-income custodial parent in satisfaction of 
a past debt that, while joint, is wholly attributable to the income of the noncustodial 
parent.6  Even if the noncustodial parent is making periodic payments towards the 
liability, whether voluntarily (under an installment agreement) or involuntarily (through 
wage garnishment), the refund due to the custodial parent will be automatically seized to 
further reduce the debt.  Thus, the custodial parent may end up paying a significant 
                                                     
1 I.R.C. § 6013(d)(3) (2012). 
2Robert W. Wood, The Marriage Trap, FORBES, June 27, 2011, at 110, available at 
http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2011/0627/money-guide-11-tax-joint-return-irs-wedding-marriage-trap.html.  
See also TAX POLICY CENTER, RETURN DETAILS BY MARITAL STATUS, 2005–2009, available at 
http:/www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxfacts/Content/PDF/returns_marital.pdf.  The figures were provided in July 
2011 by the IRS Statistics of Income Division, which reported that of 140,494,127 returns filed for tax year 
2009, 53,570,158 were returns of married persons filing jointly, while 2,539,588 were returns of married 
persons filing separately.   
3 It is theoretically possible for a married taxpayer to face a lower tax liability by filing separately, 
but I have yet to encounter this in practice.  For example, if one spouse has significant medical expenses that 
exceed 7.5% of his or her own adjusted gross income (AGI) but not the couple’s total AGI, it could benefit 
the taxpayer to file separately.  However, it is possible that the taxpayer will find him- or herself subject to 
the alternative minimum tax, negating the possible tax advantage.   
4 This is true for taxpayers at both low and high income levels, though for different reasons.  Low-
income taxpayers cannot receive the valuable earned income credit if they choose to file separately, even if 
they would be eligible for the credit if they filed jointly.  Married middle- and high-income taxpayers (those 
individuals with a taxable income of at least $68,650 in 2010) who file separately are subject to a more 
progressive income scale than unmarried taxpayers, in that their tax brackets are narrower between rate 
increases.  For example, a married individual filing separately is subject to income tax at the 33% rate starting 
at $104,625.  Contrast this to an unmarried individual, who is not subject to the 33% rate until he or she has 
taxable income of $171,850. At all income levels, married taxpayers lose the benefit of income splitting if 
they choose to file separately.  Part IV will examine the disparate treatment of similarly situated individuals 
in greater detail with a particular focus on those individuals who are eligible to receive the earned income 
credit. 
5 I.R.C. § 6402 (2012). 
6 To illustrate how sizable a single parent’s refund can be, imagine a divorced mother of three 
young children who earns $25,000 as a wage earner.  In tax year 2010, assume that the mother files as head 
of household, claims the children as dependents, and is eligible for both the earned income credit and the 
child tax credit.  (These figures disregard the Making Work Pay credit, which would have been available to 
her in 2010).  She would be due a $6,659 refund even if she had no income tax withheld from her pay in 
2010.  If the same taxpayer earned only $20,000, she would be due a $7,463 refund. 




portion (and in some cases, all) of the joint tax debt, even if the parties had agreed 
otherwise under the terms of the divorce.7  This occurs without regard to the parties’ 
respective income level and ability to pay.8 
Consider the story of Wendy Bozick, whose joint liability arose from the 
“traditional” model of the one-earner household:9 in 2003, her husband Gary earned 
$460,000 from his law practice.  Ms. Bozick, who did not perform significant work 
outside of the home that year, earned just over $1,000 in 2003.  Her husband handled all 
finances; Ms. Bozick did not have a bank account and her husband did not allow her to 
use a credit card.  Her husband gave her cash to buy groceries for the family.  He did not 
allow her to open the mail.  As the filing date for their income taxes approached, Ms. 
Bozick worried that her husband might not prepare the return.  She filed “married filing 
separately” to report her wages, which she thought she was required to do.  Ms. Bozick 
owed no tax on her separate return due to her low income.  When her husband found out, 
he became furious, telling her that filing separately rather than jointly would cost the 
family $17,000.  This is because a one-earner, high-income family enjoys the benefit of 
income splitting, which creates a “marriage bonus”10 as compared to a similarly situated 
unmarried couple.  Recognizing this, her husband had a joint return prepared and had her 
sign it without giving her a chance to examine it.  The joint return, which was filed in 
December 2004, showed the couple had a tax liability of $137,453.  Ms. Bozick 
petitioned for divorce in July 2005, and Mr. Bozick died in April 2006.  Upon his death, 
the Service collected a portion of the joint liability from his retirement plan, but a balance 
of more than $100,000 remained on the debt.  The Service turned its collection efforts on 
Ms. Bozick to collect the remainder.  By this time, she had joined the work force full-
time, but was earning only eight dollars an hour.  She was barely supporting herself and 
her children. 
                                                     
7 A divorce agreement has no effect on the Service’s collection of a joint and several liability.  The 
government defends this practice on the grounds that it is not a party to the divorce and that it would be 
impractical for the Service to become involved in divorce settlements.  See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO/T-GGD-98-72, INNOCENT SPOUSE: ALTERNATIVES FOR IMPROVING INNOCENT 
SPOUSE RELIEF 10 (1998) (“[P]roviding a legal forum where IRS and the parties to a divorce could resolve 
issues relating to both tax matters and divorce proceedings would require a fundamental and extensive 
change in either federal tax law or state domestic relations law”).  Notwithstanding the Service’s disregard 
for the couple’s agreement, one spouse may have a legal right of contribution under the divorce decree. 
8 See NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY, FY 2001 ANN. REP. TO CONG. 
139 [hereinafter TAS REPORT 2001] (showing that when married individuals file a joint return, the primary 
spouse usually earns significantly more than the secondary spouse).  The table in the report shows that this is 
true at all income levels, but is particularly pronounced at the high end and the low end: in the “under 
$30,000” income range, 91% of gross income was attributable to the primary spouse; in the “over $100,000” 
income range, 79% of income was attributable to the primary spouse.  Id.  The numbers in the table are from 
tax year 1999.  Id.  
9 All facts are taken from the Tax Court opinion Bozick v. Comm'r, 99 T.C.M. (CCH) 1242 (2010).  
This case does not hold special significance and I was not involved with this case in any capacity.  I chose 
this case because its facts provide a good illustration of the valuable marriage bonus, the ensuing risks of 
filing jointly to benefit from that bonus, and the lengthy process for seeking relief from joint liability. 
10 A marriage bonus results when a married couple enjoys tax savings by virtue of the joint filing 
rates.  The bonus is most pronounced when one spouse earns a high income and the other has little to no 
income.  The opposite phenomenon is called the “marriage penalty,” which occurs when two spouses earn 
significant and roughly equal incomes; they pay more income tax than they would in the aggregate if they 
were unmarried.  These concepts are discussed further in Part I.A.  See also infra note 54. 
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In February 2007, Ms. Bozick filed a request for “innocent spouse relief,”11 but 
the Service denied her claim in July of that year, stating, among other reasons, that she 
failed to show that it would be unfair to hold her jointly liable.  In accordance with her 
rights of judicial review, Ms. Bozick petitioned the United States Tax Court in October 
2007 and told her story again at her March 2009 trial.  On March 30, 2010, more than 
three years after her initial request for relief, the court filed its opinion in her favor and 
relieved her of this joint income tax liability.12 
This article will examine the problems and inefficiencies that arise from joint and 
several liability and the innocent spouse relief process.  In particular, I will examine the 
peculiar conundrum faced by low-income taxpayers.13  Unlike the Bozick family, which 
received a sizable economic benefit by virtue of the joint filing status, a low-income 
couple generally will receive only a nominal “marriage bonus” attributable to income 
splitting.  As I will explain, married low-income taxpayers face a conundrum because 
they cannot receive the earned income credit unless they file a joint return, subjecting 
themselves to joint and several liability.14  Meanwhile, if the married couple does file 
jointly, there is no economic advantage as compared to a similarly situated unmarried and 
cohabiting couple; in fact, the unmarried couple will typically receive a larger aggregate 
refund.15 
The article will focus on the three reasons I believe the joint filing status should 
be eliminated and all taxpayers should file as individuals: (1) the rationales for joint filing 
are less applicable than they once were; (2) Congressional attempts to address inequities 
through innocent spouse relief are a well-intended but fundamentally inefficient solution; 
and (3) it is necessary to reconsider the policy of retaining the “married” filing statuses in 
light of the ways in which family structures, society, and the Code have evolved since 
joint and several liability was enacted in 1938.  Congress should reform the current 
filing-status structures through a lens of simplicity and demographic reality.   
The article proceeds from here in four parts.  Part II will provide a brief historical 
context: why and how the U.S. tax system provides different rules and rates for married 
taxpayers, and the original reasons for imposing joint and several liability on joint 
returns.  Within that context, I will discuss why the traditional rationales underpinning 
joint and several liability are less convincing today.  This is particularly true for low-
income taxpayers, as I will discuss. 
                                                     
11 Congress first enacted innocent spouse relief in 1971 and has expanded the provisions and the 
scope of relief repeatedly over time.  Currently there are three types of relief provided in I.R.C. § 6015.  Part 
II provides a detailed history of innocent spouse relief.  
12 As I discuss elsewhere, the process for obtaining relief is typically lengthy and often involves an 
administrative or judicial appeal.  In this case, I should note that the IRS denial came quickly and the three 
year period was attributable in part to Ms. Bozick having been granted a continuance for her trial date in 
order to obtain counsel. 
13 By “low-income taxpayers” I refer to those taxpayers who are income-eligible to receive the 
earned income credit.  In 2010, a married couple with income up to $48,362 could receive the earned income 
credit, so long as they filed jointly and had at least three qualifying children.  The income limits are lower for 
couples with fewer or no children. 
14 Section 7703(b) provides an exception for certain married individuals living apart from a spouse 
during the last six months of the taxable year and maintaining a household with a child; an individual meeting 
the requirements of § 7703(b) is not considered married and thus remains eligible for the earned income 
credit because he or she is permitted to file as “head of household” rather than “married filing separately.”   
15 See infra Part IV.B. 




Part III will present a detailed overview of the procedures for innocent spouse 
relief.  The innocent spouse relief process is time-consuming, inefficient, and results in 
inconsistent outcomes.  It is not uncommon for a taxpayer to spend several years and 
untold resources trying to obtain the legal relief he or she seeks.16  The majority of initial 
requests for innocent spouse relief are denied,17 meaning the taxpayer must pursue an 
administrative appeal and often judicial review of the claim.  In recent years the process 
has become ever more liberalized, broadening the grounds for relief and the scope of 
judicial review if relief is denied.  In 1998, when Congress enacted § 6015(f),18 more 
taxpayers became eligible for relief and the number of claims increased.  Since that time, 
the Service has regularly received up to fifty thousand requests for innocent spouse relief 
a year, and it grants fewer than half of them.19  Taxpayers are statutorily entitled to 
petition the Tax Court if the Service denies the request for relief; innocent spouse appeals 
are consistently among the ten most litigated tax issues in federal court each year.20  The 
facts set out in the Tax Court’s opinion in Bozick certainly weighed in her favor and 
portrayed her in a sympathetic light.  Yet it took her three years to obtain relief.  Her 
administrative request was denied, and one presumes that the IRS was unwilling or 
unable to settle the case in her favor after she filed her Tax Court petition.21  Over the 
course of three years, imagine how many hours of work must have been devoted to this 
file: by the IRS Innocent Spouse Unit, the Tax Court, and Ms. Bozick and her attorney.  
During that time, Ms. Bozick endured financial hardship and struggled to raise her 
children.  While I agree with the Tax Court’s finding in this specific case and support the 
Congressional intent of the innocent spouse provisions generally, I maintain that the 
process is burdensome to taxpayers and is an inefficient use of administrative and judicial 
                                                     
16 See TAS REPORT 2001, supra note 8, at 134 ("Given the many steps and legal requirements in the 
process, even the best case scenario requires 304 days to process a claim for relief under IRC § 6015."). 
17 See id. at 128  (stating that the IRS rejects 49% of claims for not meeting requirements for 
consideration and only 47.7% of the remaining claims obtain any relief).  See also NAT’L TAXPAYER 
ADVOCATE, ANOTHER MARRIAGE PENALTY—TAXING THE WRONG SPOUSE, FY 2005 ANN. REP TO CONG. 423 
(2005) [hereinafter TAS REPORT 2005] (citing a 2005 IRS report that found innocent spouse relief was 
granted at the administrative level “on only about 30 percent of all claims”). 
18 References to a statute section are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, unless 
otherwise indicated. 
19 In many recent years, the Service has reported receiving more than fifty thousand requests for 
innocent spouse relief.  See, e.g., Nicola M. White, Lawmakers Urge IRS to Review Innocent Spouse Relief 
Regulations, 131 TAX NOTES TODAY 358 (2011); Laura Saunders, A New Push to Protect Spouses, WALL ST. 
J., May 28, 2011, at 9-B.9.  A significant number of these requests are immediately rejected for not meeting 
threshold criteria.  Of the remaining requests, the relief rate is still low.  See, e.g., Carla Fried, For ‘Innocent 
Spouses,’ a Helpful Shift in I.R.S. Policy, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2012, at 11-BU.11 (stating that “22 percent of 
the 32,000 cases filed each year that qualify for review are granted full relief”). 
20 See I.R.C. § 7803(c)(2)(B)(ii)(X) (2012) (mandating that the National Taxpayer Advocate report 
to Congress annually on the “10 most litigated issues for each category of taxpayers”).  Innocent spouse relief 
has appeared on this “top ten” list every year since 2004.  See e.g., NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, THE MOST 
LITIGATED ISSUES, FY 2011 ANN. REP. TO CONG. 589 (2011) [hereinafter TAS REPORT 2011] (listing relief 
from joint and several liability as the eighth most litigated issue from June 1, 2010, to May 31, 2011).  The 
list includes only those cases for which an opinion is issued; since 2007, more than seventy-five percent of 
docketed Tax Court cases are settled each year, and fewer than three percent of docketed cases resulted in 
trial and decision.  Id. at 591.  Thus, the vast majority of docketed cases are therefore not reflected in these 
annual lists.   
21 Once a petition is filed with the Tax Court, cases are automatically sent to an IRS Appeals office, 
which concentrates on attempting to settle cases prior to trial.  That Ms. Bozick's trial went forward indicates 
that the parties were unable to do so.  More than seventy-five percent of Tax Court cases are settled outside 
of court.  Supra note 20. 
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resources.  Moving to an individual filing system would eliminate the need for innocent 
spouse relief, allowing those resources to be devoted elsewhere.  
Part IV examines some of the solutions previously proposed to address the 
shortcomings of the innocent spouse relief framework.  A chorus of scholars, professional 
associations, and the National Taxpayer Advocate has recommended one solution in 
particular—to eliminate joint and several liability for joint filers.22  This solution would 
address the first two of my concerns; importantly, it would render the innocent spouse 
relief process unnecessary, because each spouse would only be liable for tax arising from 
his or her proportionate income.  At the direction of Congress, the Department of 
Treasury studied this and other proposals in 1998 and issued a comprehensive report of 
its findings.  The report concluded that there were sound policy and practical reasons to 
retain joint filing and joint and several liability for married couples.  Instead of adopting 
the proposals to eliminate joint and several liability, the report recommended modifying 
the Code to accommodate more cases by expanding the grounds for innocent spouse 
relief.23  Congress followed this recommendation, greatly broadening the circumstances 
under which a joint filer can later apply for relief.  As a result, since 1998 there has been 
a drastic rise in the number of innocent spouse relief claims filed and a corresponding 
increase in the amount of resources devoted to innocent spouse claims.  Part IV examines 
the reasons the Treasury Department did not believe it was appropriate to replace or 
reform the joint and several liability standard; with the benefit of hindsight, I evaluate 
those arguments. 
While I believe eliminating joint liability would have been a positive solution, I 
discuss in Part V why I believe Congress should go even further: it should eliminate joint 
filing altogether and require all taxpayers to file an individual return of their own 
income.24  Part V will elaborate on the third of the concerns I outlined above, namely, 
that the Code does not properly reflect the demographic reality of twenty-first century 
America.  Today there are many more accepted versions of what constitutes a 
“household” or “family unit” than there were in the mid-twentieth century, making the 
“married filing jointly” status an antiquated concept.  Marital status should not be used as 
a proxy for household composition because this does not match the reality.  There are 
many reasons why it is time for the Code to shift away from a system that assumes and 
favors a married couple with only one spouse in the labor force: the rise of divorced 
                                                     
22 In the 1990s, the recommenders included the American Bar Association, the American Institute 
of Certified Public Accountants, and other academic commentators.  TAS REPORT 2005, supra note 17, at 
409 n.13; see also DEP’T. OF THE TREAS., REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON JOINT LIABILITY AND INNOCENT 
SPOUSE ISSUES 34–41 (1998) [hereinafter 1998 TREAS. REPORT ON JL AND IS], available at 
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/innospos.pdf. 
23 Id. at 57–58. 
24 This article will focus primarily on the concerns of low-income taxpayers, but numerous scholars 
have argued for mandatory individual filing on a variety of policy grounds.  See, e.g., Lily Kahng, One is the 
Loneliest Number: The Single Taxpayer in a Joint Return World, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 651, 684 (2010) (arguing 
that the joint return should be abolished because it penalizes single people).  See also James Puckett, 
Rethinking Tax Priorities: Marriage Neutrality, Children, and Contemporary Families, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 
1409, 1434 (2010) (arguing that “[t]he joint return (and special rates for married taxpayers) should be 
abolished as an incoherent penalty and subsidy of marriage”); EDWARD J. MCCAFFERY, TAXING WOMEN 19–
23 (1997) (advocating individual filing as more beneficial for women); Lawrence Zelenak, Marriage and the 
Income Tax, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 339 (1994) (concluding that mandatory separate returns present the best 
option among imperfect neutralities); Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Love, Money, and the IRS: Family, Income 
Sharing, and the Joint Income Tax Return, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 63, 108 (1993) (arguing that individual tax 
returns would be more equitable).   




individuals and single-parent households; the rise in the number of two-earner 
households; the significant increase in the number of couples who live together in a 
household but do not wed; and the unavailability of this filing status for individuals in 
same-sex partnerships or marriage.   
My argument—that demographic trends matter—will focus in particular on low-
income taxpayers.  It examines how the value of the earned income credit, a refundable 
credit primarily benefiting parents that was not added to the Code until several decades 
after the joint filing status was introduced, has changed the stakes for low-income 
taxpayers when deciding upon a filing status.  Married taxpayers must accept the risks of 
joint and several liability or else sacrifice eligibility for the refundable earned income 
credit; choosing the latter may mean the taxpayers forsake thousands of dollars to help 
support their household.   
If the couple files jointly and a deficiency is later determined, it is true that the 
spouse who did not earn the income or claim the deduction causing the unpaid tax can 
file an innocent spouse request for relief from joint liability.  In fact, low-income 
taxpayers (as Ms. Bozick was at the time she filed) are especially likely to file for such 
relief.  Taxpayers who request innocent spouse relief are disproportionately low-income 
women who are unmarried; often they are struggling to maintain a home for children.25  
Most often, it is the ex-wife who requests innocent spouse relief, and she constitutes the 
lower-earning half of the divorced couple.26  Low-income taxpayers qualify for pro bono 
legal representation in their innocent spouse claims,27 presuming that they know to 
inquire about such relief and have the time to work with counsel in pursuing it.  But it is 
certainly not an easy, pleasant, or quick process to endure, and there is a high likelihood 
the taxpayer will not prevail.28 
Meanwhile, unmarried couples raising children together, a demographic group 
that has increased at a dramatic rate since 1960,29 do not face a filing dilemma that might 
result in having to apply for relief from joint liability.  Those low-income divorcées who 
have endured the innocent spouse relief request process may find it especially galling to 
learn that an unmarried couple, in fact, can receive a higher overall earned income credit 
than a married couple with an identical household income.   
                                                     
25 TAS REPORT 2005, supra note 17, at 422 (citing data from tax year 2001).  For this statistical 
reason, I refer to the requesting spouse in the feminine or focus my arguments on women in particular.  This 
is not to suggest that men do not file or succeed with claims for innocent spouse relief; in fact, in one of my 
first innocent spouse cases I represented an ex-husband who was granted relief at the administrative appeal 
level. 
26 Most innocent spouse claims are filed by the lower-earning spouse, which is usually the woman.  
TAS REPORT 2001, supra note 8, at 132.  “Nearly 90% of the claims filed for relief from Joint and Several 
Liability are filed by women with earned income that is approximately 25% of the total income on a joint 
return.”  Id. at 128. 
27 Congress funds a Low-Income Taxpayer Clinic (LITC) program administered by the Taxpayer 
Advocate Service.  This program, which was established in 1998 with the addition of I.R.C. § 7526, provides 
federal matching grants to non-profit organizations that provide legal representation to income-eligible 
taxpayers who have a controversy with the Internal Revenue Service.  I direct the LITC program at 
Washington and Lee University School of Law, and this article is inspired in large part by my experiences 
working with these clients. 
28 Supra note 17. 
29 See THE NAT’L MARRIAGE PROJECT, THE STATE OF OUR UNIONS: THE SOCIAL HEALTH OF 
MARRIAGE IN AMERICA 29 (2003) (charting the 850% increase of unmarried, cohabiting, adult couples living 
with one or more children under age 15 from the 1960s to 2000; the figure increased from 197,000 in 1960 to 
1.675 million in 2000). 
2012] DECOUPLING TAXES AND MARRIAGE 103 
 
It would be far more beneficial to married low-income taxpayers if Congress 
were to amend the Code so as not to condition the earned income tax credit (or any form 
of perceived “marriage bonus”) on joint filing.  Congress can address this conundrum and 
today’s complex demographic reality without adding further complexity to the Code.  
Congress should respond to the calls for a simpler and more coherent Code by reducing 
the number of individual filing statuses from four to two, ignoring marital status while 
retaining a distinction in the treatment of taxpayers with and without children.  
II. HOW DID WE GET HERE? (HISTORY AND PURPOSE OF JOINT FILING 
STATUS) 
Much has been written about the history of joint filing and the rationale behind 
joint and several liability.30  In order to appreciate the shortcomings and drawbacks of 
joint and several liability, it is important to first consider why the current system is as it 
is.   
A. Shared Risks: Tracing the History of Joint and Several Liability  
Joint and several liability for married taxpayers has been the settled rule of the 
Code since 1938, but it was not always the rule.  Early revenue laws enacted in 191331 
and 191632 imposed taxation on individuals.  In 1918, married taxpayers were permitted 
to file a joint return and could aggregate their income as well as their losses and 
deductions, but the Code left open the question of how to allocate the liability between 
spouses.33   
The idea of joint and several liability originated not with Congress, but in an 
internal office decision known as I.T. 1575, which was published by the Bureau of 
Internal Revenue in 1923.34  Even after the Supreme Court held otherwise,35 the 
Commissioner took the position that this type of office decision—published by the 
Income Tax Unit of the Bureau with a cautionary note that they “have none of the force 
or effect of Treasury Decisions and do not commit the Department to any interpretation 
of the law”—evinced the intent of Congress if the underlying revenue acts were 
reenacted without change.36  Thus, even though the Code was silent on the issue, in 
litigation the Commissioner repeatedly advanced the position that joint and several 
liability was “settled administrative practice.”37  
In Cole v. Commissioner, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals considered the 
question of joint liability on joint returns and ruled that “spouses are not jointly and 
                                                     
30 For a detailed history of joint and several liability, see 1998 TREAS. REPORT ON JL AND IS, supra 
note 22.  See also Richard C. E. Beck, The Innocent Spouse Problem: Joint and Several Liability for Income 
Taxes Should Be Repealed, 43 VAND. L. REV. 317 (1990) (providing a detailed history of the origins of the 
joint return, Cole, and the subsequent introduction of joint liability); Bryan T. Camp, The Unhappy Marriage 
of Law and Equity in Joint Return Liability, 108 TAX NOTES 1307 (2005). 
31 Revenue Act of 1913, Pub. L. No. 63-16, ch. 16, § II (A)(1), 38 Stat. 114, 166 (1913). 
32 Revenue Act of 1916, Pub. L. No. 64-271, ch. 463, § 1(a), 39 Stat. 756 (1916). 
33 See Beck, supra note 30, at 335; see also TAS REPORT 2001, supra note 8, at 132.  Separate rate 
brackets for joint returns were not introduced until 1948.  
34 I.T. 1575, 1923-1 C.B. 144 (1923) (“[W]here a husband and wife filed a joint return they are 
individually liable for the full amount of tax shown to be due on such return.”). 
35 Helvering v. N.Y. Trust Co., 292 U.S. 455 (1934). 
36 See Cole v. Comm'r, 81 F.2d 485, 488 (9th Cir. 1935) (noting the conflict between the 
Commissioner's arguments and the cautionary notice in the bulletin).   
37 Id. (citing Helvering, 292 U.S. at 467–68).  See also Comm'r v. Rabenold, 108 F.2d 639, 641 (2d 
Cir. 1940) (“[O]nly by implication can such a liability be found in the 1932 Act, and taxing laws are not to be 
extended by implication.”). 




severally liable for a deficiency arising entirely out of the separate income of one of 
them.”38  Louis and Frida Cole filed a joint income tax return for 1929.  At that time, a 
husband and wife could choose to include their respective incomes on a joint return and 
be subject to tax on the aggregate income; deductions and credits to which either were 
entitled would be taken from the aggregate income.  After the Coles filed their joint 
return, the Service determined a deficiency in the amount of $27,568.  The petitioner, 
who was the executrix of Mr. Cole’s estate, argued the husband and wife were each 
“liable only for the proportion of the tax attributable to his share of the aggregate 
income.”39  The Commissioner, following the Bureau’s administrative practice of 
imposing joint and several liability as set out in I.T. 1575, argued that it was “impossible” 
for the Service to prorate the liability because the liability had been calculated on their 
combined income.40  The Board of Tax Appeals had previously rejected the 
Commissioner’s argument that a husband and wife filing jointly became “a single taxing 
entity, and as such, ‘the taxpayer.’”41  The Commissioner, in his brief in Cole, set forth 
the position that “the husband and wife, must of course, accept this unusual privilege of 
reducing their taxes as it exists with all of its necessary concomitant conditions and 
results.”42  The Ninth Circuit did not agree with the Commissioner, finding that any 
administrative difficulties of apportioning the liability could be overcome; the court 
pointed out that, in this case, the apportioned liabilities had in fact been stipulated. 
Despite the outcome in Cole, the Commissioner subsequently persisted in 
arguing that joint and several liability must attach to a joint filing, as a matter of 
administrative convenience.43  With the enactment of the Revenue Act of 1938 
(hereinafter “1938 Act”), the Service finally got its wish: Congress added subsection 
51(b), which stated “the liability with respect to the tax shall be joint and several.”44  
After the 1938 Act, the Commissioner then began arguing in ongoing litigation involving 
tax years prior to the effective date of the 1938 Act that § 51 “should be deemed merely 
declaratory of existing law under prior revenue acts.”45 
In Cole, the Commissioner noted the taxpayers reduced their taxes by filing 
jointly, with the tax being computed on their aggregate income.  At the time of Cole, joint 
filing produced a reduction in tax only when one spouse had deductions (including 
losses) or credits that could offset the income of the other.  Unlike our present system, in 
which there are five separate filing statuses and four accompanying rate structures, the 
tax rates prior to 1948 were uniform for all types of returns.  Thus, for many married 
                                                     
38 Cole, 81 F.2d. at 489. 
39 Id. at 486. 
40 Id. at 490. 
41 Id. (citing Gummey v. Comm’r, 26 B.T.A. 894, 895–96 (1932)). 
42 Id. at 487 (emphasis added). 
43 See, e.g., Uniacke v. Comm'r, 132 F.2d 781, 783 (2d Cir. 1942) (ruling that joint and several 
liability did not attach).  In a case involving tax year 1936, the court stated: “The argument based on 
administrative convenience does not impress us . . . . The administrative difficulties resulting from rejecting 
the Commissioner's construction of the statute would seem to be somewhat exaggerated in the argument.”  
See also Estate of Hague v. Comm'r, 45 B.T.A. 104, 113 (1941) (in which the Commissioner argued for joint 
and several liability for a couple where the income in question was solely the husband’s); Rabenold, 108 F.2d 
at 640. 
44 Revenue Act of 1938, Pub. L. No 75-554, ch. 289, § 51(b), 52 Stat. 447, 476 (1938).  The 
Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, retains the same language in § 6013(d)(3): “if a joint return is 
made, the tax shall be computed on the aggregate income and the liability with respect to the tax shall be joint 
and several.” 
45 Rabenold, 108 F.2d at 640. 
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couples, the effect of aggregating income was to push the couple into a higher tax 
bracket, resulting in a higher liability than if the couple had filed as two individuals.46  A 
couple would not benefit from joint filing unless one spouse had deductions or credits 
that could offset the income of the other spouse.   
In unpacking the rationales of joint and several liability, it is important to 
recognize that the reduction and ensuing “unusual privilege” referred to by the 
Commissioner in Cole should not be confused with so-called “income splitting,” which 
was not a benefit of joint filing until the Revenue Act of 1948 created a separate rate 
structure for married couples.47  Somewhat ironically, income splitting was a 
phenomenon that was first enjoyed by married couples who filed separate returns in 
community property states.  Under the theory that income earned by one spouse was 
community property of the other spouse, in 1930 the Supreme Court ruled in Poe v. 
Seaborn that spouses were permitted to file separately and each treat one half of the 
spouses’ community property income as his or her income for tax purposes.48  Thus, if 
the husband earned $10,000, and the wife did not have any income, each would file a 
separate return reporting $5,000 of income.  Joint and several liability did not attach, 
because the spouses filed separately.49  Yet due to the nature of the progressive rate 
structure, the taxpayers benefitted from the lower rates applicable to the lower income 
amounts.  
For a time following Seaborn, only taxpayers who lived in community property 
states enjoyed the benefits of income splitting because each individual was subject to tax 
on one-half of the couple’s total income.  At the same time, taxpayers in common law 
states who filed a joint return had to aggregate their income, but were subject to tax under 
the same “steeply progressive” rate structure.50  Congress was concerned when a number 
of states, concerned about the unequal tax treatment of their residents, moved to adopt the 
community property system.51  To address this disparity, the Revenue Act of 1948 
introduced a new rate schedule for married taxpayers filing a joint return.52  
So while Congress established joint and several liability for married filers in 
1938, it was not until ten years later, in 1948, when the new separate rate schedules were 
                                                     
46 See Grant v. Rose, 24 F.2d 115, 118–19 (N.D. Ga. 1928) (summarizing these advantages and 
disadvantages), aff'd, 39 F.2d 340 (5th Cir. 1930). 
47 Revenue Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-471, ch. 168, § 301, 62 Stat. 110, 114 (1948). 
48 Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101, 118 (1930). 
49 State laws in community property states vary as to whether the interests of each spouse are 
subject to lien or levy by the Service.  In at least some community property states, the Service can collect the 
separate tax liability of one spouse from the other spouse’s community income.  See 1998 TREAS. REPORT ON 
JL AND IS, supra note 22.  In 1980, Congress enacted § 66 to provide limited relief to taxpayers in 
community property states.  Section 66, while important to those who live in community property states, is 
outside the scope of this article. 
50 See S. REP. NO. 80-1013, at 22 (1948), reprinted in 1948 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1163, 1184 (describing 
the existing law: “Since the rates applied under the income tax are steeply progressive, the same family 
income divided in two halves by community property law will be taxed far less severely than in a common-
law State where the whole income is apt to be taxed to one spouse.”). 
51 Id., at 24–25.  The legislative history gives another interesting reason for adopting income 
splitting in the Code: “The incentive for married couples in common-law states to attempt the reduction of 
their taxes by the division of their income through such devices as trusts, joint tenancies, and family 
partnerships will be reduced materially.  Administrative difficulties stemming from the use of such devices 
will be diminished, and there will be less need for meticulous legislation on the income-tax treatment of trusts 
and family partnerships.”  
52 Revenue Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-471, ch. 168, § 301, 26 U.S.C. §12, 62 Stat. 110, 114 
(1948).   




introduced, that most taxpayers had an economic incentive to file a joint return.53  
Significantly, the new rate schedules benefitted all married taxpayers versus their 
unmarried peers, because at that time the brackets were exactly twice as wide as the rate 
schedule for unmarried taxpayers.   
As a result of this structure, a married couple was not worse off in 1948 under the 
married filing jointly rates than under the individual rates.  One spouse’s deductions 
could be used to offset the income of the other (as in Cole), without the couple facing 
higher rates (as they had prior to the Revenue Act of 1948).  The benefits of income 
splitting enjoyed by married couples were especially favorable when one spouse (at that 
time, almost certainly the husband) worked and the other spouse did not.  This 
phenomenon became known as the “marriage bonus.”54 
Over time, Congress recognized that the pendulum had swung too far in favor of 
married couples.  The Tax Reform Act of 1969 created a new, lower rate schedule for 
unmarried persons to correct the fact that, due to income splitting, an unmarried person’s 
tax was as much as forty-two percent higher than the tax paid by a married couple filing 
jointly reporting the same total income as the unmarried person.55  The Joint Committee 
on Taxation explained in its report accompanying the Act: 
With the new rate schedule for single persons, married couples filing a 
joint return will pay more tax than two single persons with the same total 
income.  This is a necessary result of changing the income-splitting 
relationship between single and joint returns.  Moreover, it is justified on 
the grounds that although a married couple has greater living expenses 
than a single person and hence should pay less tax, the couple’s living 
expenses are likely to be less than those of two single persons and 
therefore the couple’s tax should be higher than that of two single 
persons.56 
With that rationale underlying the Tax Reform Act of 1969, the “marriage 
penalty” was born.  However, Congress did not reconsider the fairness of joint and 
several liability—if the “privilege” of income splitting was now eroded for many couples, 
should a spouse still be held liable for the other’s tax liability?57  Significantly, Congress 
                                                     
53 See Beck, supra note 30, at 337 n.78 (citing legislative history showing that, in 1938, when it 
was rarely the case that a couple would benefit economically by filing jointly, ninety-four percent of married 
couples filed a joint return) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 1040, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. at 16-17 (1941), reprinted in 
1941-2 C.B. 413, 426-27).  Beck points out that federal income tax rates were low enough in 1938 that it 
made no difference in most people's tax rates whether they filed jointly or separately; he posits that most of 
these couples filed jointly for the sake of the convenience of filling out one form rather than two, rather than 
to achieve tax savings. 
54 For a historical examination of marriage bonuses and penalties, see Lawrence Zelenak, Doing 
Something About Marriage Penalties: A Guide for the Perplexed, 54 TAX L. REV. 1 (2000).  Zelenak notes 
that while the 1948 legislation achieved couples neutrality, its purpose was “a delayed response to geographic 
discrimination between husbands in separate property states and those in community property states.”  Id. at 
4.  Zelenak notes, as others have, that the goals of progressivity, couples neutrality, and marriage neutrality 
are incompatible.  In both this article and in his article entitled Marriage and the Income Tax, supra note 24, 
Zelenak states his preference for mandatory separate filing. 
55 STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 99th CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF 1969 TAX REFORM 
ACT 222 (Joint Comm. Print 1970).   
56 Id. at 223. 
57 In his 1990 article, Beck said the following about the introduction of the marriage penalty in the 
Tax Reform Act of 1969: “The argument that income splitting justifies joint return liability seems hollow for 
that forty percent of married couples who suffer the marriage penalty. While they may be better off filing 
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seems to envision two types of households in its thinking—that of an unmarried single 
person, and that of a married couple.   
What about an unmarried couple living together, sharing household expenses, or 
any number of nontraditional household units?58  Demographically, the number of those 
households may have been statistically less significant in 1969, but today this is not the 
case.  The rate of cohabitation in the United States is fourteen times higher in 2010 than it 
was in 1970, and approximately twenty-four percent of children are born to cohabiting 
couples.59  The legislative intent of certain Code provisions thus seems antiquated when 
viewed in light of the nation’s changed demographics. 
B. Examining the Stated Rationales of Joint and Several Liability: Does the 
Intent Still Make Sense in Twenty-First Century America? 
1. Administrative Ease for Taxpayers and Government 
Dating back to the Commissioner’s briefs in Cole and continuing today, 
administrative ease has been an oft-cited rationale in support of both joint return filing 
and joint and several liability.60  The legislative history of the Revenue Act of 1938, 
picking up on the arguments made by the Commissioner in Cole and earlier cases, stated:  
Unless the husband and wife are to be held jointly and severally liable 
for the tax upon their aggregate net income, it will be necessary for the 
[IRS] to require that their individual incomes and deductions shall be 
separately stated in the return, in order that their respective income-tax 
liability may be separately determined.  Such a requirement would cause 
considerable hardship upon taxpayers with moderate incomes and would 
largely eliminate the advantages of the joint return.61  
It is true that if the married filing jointly status were eliminated, there would be a 
sharp increase in the number of returns that the Service must process.  It is also true that 
would create an added burden for married taxpayers, who must prepare, or pay for the 
preparation of, two individual returns rather than one joint return.62   
However, technology has come quite a long way since 1938.  The Service does 
not process returns by hand, nor do most taxpayers prepare a return with pencil and 
paper.  Since 1986, the Service has encouraged (and, more recently, mandated in some 
cases) the electronic filing of income tax returns.  These efforts are working.  In June of 
                                                                                                                                                 
jointly than filing separately, they would be still better off if they had never married, or were divorced. From 
this vantage point, filing jointly, as ninety-nine percent of married persons do, involves an overall tax 
detriment, rather than a benefit. If joint return liability were justified on a quid pro quo theory, the liability 
probably should have been abolished in 1969, when the marriage penalty arose.”  Beck, supra note 30, at 
372. 
58 I conclude it is appropriate to reconsider the current structures in light of other code provisions 
and changing demographics.  See infra Part IV. 
59 THE NAT’L MARRIAGE PROJECT, Executive Summary to WHY MARRIAGE MATTERS: THIRTY 
CONCLUSIONS FROM THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 1 (3d ed. 2011), available at 
http://www.americanvalues.org/pdfs/dl.php?name=wmm3es. 
60 The Treasury Department invoked this rationale in its 1998 report eschewing separate filing in 
favor of expanded innocent spouse reform.  See infra Part III.  But see Comm'r v. Uniacke, 132 F.2d 781, 783 
(2d Cir. 1942) (dismissing the rationale of administrative convenience); Comm'r v. Rabenold, 108 F.2d 639, 
640 (2d Cir. 1940) (recognizing the administrative inconvenience of apportioning tax deficiencies between 
husband and wife). Both cases were decided under pre-1938 law. 
61 1998 TREAS. REPORT ON JL AND IS, supra note 22, at 6–7 (citing H.R. 1860, 75th Cong. 2d Sess., 
1939-1 C.B. 749) (emphasis added). 
62 Id. at 25–27.  




2011, the Service announced that it has processed more than one billion total individual 
tax returns through its electronic filing program.  This statistic included more than 100 
million individual tax returns (representing 79% of individual income tax returns filed) 
that were e-filed during the 2011 filing season.63  Contrast this with tax year 1998, in 
which only 19% (25 million out of 123 million) of all individual income tax returns were 
e-filed.64   
In her 2005 Annual Report to Congress, Nina Olson recommended that Congress 
eliminate joint and several liability and instead require married taxpayers to file a split-
column tax return.65  She noted that Congress had cited “administrative” reasons when it 
imposed joint liability in 1938, and that administrative challenges had again been cited as 
a hurdle by the Treasury Department in its 1998 study.66  Her 2005 report described 
updates to the Service’s computer system and the rise of e-filing as two reasons that those 
administrative challenges were less significant in 2005 than they were even in 1998.67  
She further suggested that, to the extent these administrative challenges remain, they 
“could also be partially offset by the reduction in, or elimination of, innocent spouse 
relief” and several other related issues that arise from joint filing.68 
One issue of concern is that the trend towards e-filing, however positive for the 
Service, creates a new difficulty in the joint and several liability context because an 
actual signature is not required on an electronically filed return.69  This facilitates the 
ability of one spouse to enter the tax information and file the return without the other 
spouse ever having the opportunity to review or sign the return.  Similarly, a spouse who 
reviews and approves a joint return would not know if the other spouse makes subsequent 
changes prior to filing it.  Given the structural incentives to file jointly, I believe there 
will be an increase in this type of “forgery” as e-filing becomes the norm.  If the other 
spouse objects to the filing, the Service must undergo a factual determination as to 
whether the filing spouse forged a signature or merely acted with tacit consent based on 
past practice within the marriage.70  This is another example of how joint liability creates 
an additional burden on Service resources. 
The rise of e-filing thus provides two important reasons in support of Congress 
eliminating joint filing: (1) in light of this technological advance, “administrative ease” is 
no longer a convincing rationale in support of joint return; and (2) it can be very difficult 
to ensure that both spouses reviewed and consented to a joint return that is filed 
electronically. 
                                                     
63 INTERNAL REV. SERV., ONE BILLION SERVED: IRS E-FILE PASSES MAJOR MILESTONE, IR-2011-64 
(June 9, 2011), available at http://www.irs.gov/uac/One-Billion-Served:-IRS-E-File-Passes-Major-Milestone.  
64 Nat’l Taxpayer Advocate, Key Legislative Recommendation: Another Marriage Penalty - Taxing 
the Wrong Spouse, 2005 ANN. REP. TO CONG. 426 (citing IRS Pub. 55B, Data Book (Mar. 1998) (Tables 3 and 
4)). 
65 Id. at 408–09. 
66 See infra Part III. 
67 Nat’l Taxpayer Advocate, supra note 64, at 425–26.  
68 Id. at 426.  Olson mentions community property relief, injured spouse relief, and “numerous 
other IRC provisions that override community property rules in an ad hoc fashion.”  Id. at 426.  While 
outside the scope of this article, each of these issues exists because of joint and several liability. 
69 INTERNAL REV. SERV., TAXPAYERS WHO FILE ELECTRONICALLY MUST USE E-SIGNATURES, FS-
2011-07 (Jan. 2011), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-news/fs-11-07.pdf.  
70 I.R.M. § 25.15.1.2.4 (Mar. 4, 2011) available at http://www.irs.gov/irm/part25/irm_25-015-
001.html#d0e231 (providing guidance to Service employees as to the conditions under which a joint return is 
invalid).  These questions are technically outside of innocent spouse relief, because § 6015 relief is only 
available when the requesting spouse has signed a joint income tax return. 
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2. Joint Liability as the Price for the “Privilege” of Filing Jointly 
The “privilege” of filing a joint return is frequently invoked as a justification in 
support of joint and several liability.  Interestingly, the use of the word precedes the 
introduction of income splitting and the concept of the marriage bonus.  It dates back at 
least to Cole, when the Commissioner spoke of the “‘unusual privilege’ of filing a joint 
return.”71  The legislative history accompanying the Revenue Act of 1938 echoed the 
Commissioner’s use of the word “privilege”: 
Section 51(b) of the bill expressly provides that the spouses, who 
exercise the privilege of filing a joint return, are jointly and severally 
liable for the tax computed upon their aggregate income.  It is necessary, 
for administrative reasons, that any doubt as to the existence of such 
liability should be set at rest, if the privilege of filing such joint returns is 
continued.72 
Courts emphasized this “privilege” after Congress first introduced innocent 
spouse relief in 1971.  In its oft-cited Sonnenborn opinion released that same year, the 
Tax Court wrote of the privilege as a fact that must be kept in mind when weighing 
innocent spouse relief: 
It is important that these provisions be kept in proper perspective.  The 
filing of a joint return is a highly valuable privilege to husband and wife 
since the resulting tax liability is generally substantially less than the 
combined taxes that would be due from both spouses if they had filed 
separate returns.  This circumstance gives particular emphasis to the 
statutory rule that liability with respect to tax is joint and several, 
regardless of the source of the income or of the fact that one spouse may 
be far less informed about the contents of the return than the other, for 
both spouses ordinarily benefit from the reduction in tax that ensues by 
reason of the joint return . . . . [I]t must be kept in mind that Congress 
still regards joint and several liability as an important adjunct to the 
privilege of filing joint returns, and that if there is to be any relaxation of 
that rule the taxpayer must comply with the carefully detailed conditions 
set forth in section 6013(e).73 
These words, written more than forty years ago, have been cited with 
frequency.74  As discussed in Part III, the innocent spouse provisions have changed 
considerably since 1971.  But that is not all that has changed, in the Code or in society 
generally.  If a “price”75 is to be paid by taxpayers for this “privilege,” we must consider 
to what extent and for whom joint filing remains a privilege today.  
                                                     
71 Cole v. Comm'r, 81 F.2d 485, 487 (9th Cir. 1935). 
72 H.R. Rep. No. 1860, at 29–30 (1938).  
73 Sonnenborn v. Comm’r, 57 T.C. 373, 380–81 (1971) (discussing why the innocent spouse 
provisions must be narrowly construed) (emphasis added).  Section 6013(e) was the innocent spouse 
provision in effect at the time.  As the opinion notes in footnote 3, the innocent spouse provision became law 
on January 12, 1971, but by virtue of its enacting legislation the relief was applicable to all taxable years to 
which the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 applied. 
74 See, e.g., Ogonoski v. Comm’r, 87 T.C.M. (CCH) 1038; Crowley v. Comm’r, 70 T.C.M. (CCH) 
1374; Prince v. Comm’r, 70 T.C.M. (CCH) 309; Murphy v. Comm’r, 103 T.C. 111 (1994).  
75 Sonnenborn did not use the term “price” with respect to the privilege, but subsequent courts 
citing Sonnenborn for this principle have used this term.  See, e.g., Stevens v. Comm’r, 872 F.2d 1499, 1503 
(11th Cir. 1989) (“The rate of tax applied against a given amount of income generally is lower when the 




In the intervening six decades since income splitting was introduced, two major 
changes to the Code have occurred that erode the “unusual privilege” argument: (1) the 
introduction of the marriage penalty; and (2) the introduction of the earned income credit.  
Changing demographics exacerbate the effects of these changes to the Code.  If the 
privilege represents the reduction in tax achieved by joint filing, then it is only a privilege 
to the extent that such reduction can be accomplished.  The so-called “privilege” of filing 
jointly has no actual value to many married taxpayers versus similarly situated taxpayers 
who are unmarried and file as single.  While the joint filing status may be a “highly 
valuable privilege” for some, it is certainly not the case for all taxpayers. 
Income splitting is one phenomenon that results in reduction of tax, and is most 
pronounced in cases where one spouse earns a high income and the other does not work.  
However, a couple in which both spouses earn a high income is likely to face not a 
marriage bonus but a marriage penalty; in these cases, the spouses would owe a smaller 
aggregate tax liability if they were permitted to file as unmarried individuals.  Arguably, 
there is no “privilege” for two high-earners who must file as married, yet they are held 
jointly and severally liable for filing jointly.76 
A low-income couple faces a similarly illogical conundrum: their benefit from 
income splitting is likely nominal as compared to a one-earner high income couple such 
as the Bozicks, but they must accept joint and several liability as a condition of receiving 
the earned income credit.  At the same time, a similarly situated unmarried couple would 
receive a higher aggregate refund than the married couple.  Joint filing cannot be said to 
be a “highly valuable privilege” if the resulting refund is less favorable.  Part V explores 
this conundrum in greater detail. 
III. RELIEF IS AVAILABLE TO SOME INNOCENT SPOUSES, BUT AT WHAT 
COST TO THE SYSTEM? 
The process affording relief to innocent spouses has become increasingly 
liberalized over the past forty years, allowing a requesting spouse broader grounds for 
relief and appeal.  This is well intended; if there is to be a system for relief, it should be a 
comprehensive process that seeks the most equitable outcome.  But as we consider the 
state of the relief process today, let us also flip the “highly valuable privilege” theory of 
joint liability on its head.   
Considerable resources are devoted to the resolution of these highly factual “he-
said, she-said” marital disputes each year.  Are these costs really worth the benefits of 
joint and several liability to the government?  In other words, would the Service be better 
off if Congress repealed § 6013(d)(3) and adopted a system of separate rather than joint 
liability for spouses?  Given the divorce rate, among other factors, would it not be easier 
                                                                                                                                                 
income is reported on a joint return than when a husband and wife file separate returns.  The price which the 
law exacts for this privilege is that taxpayers who file a joint return are jointly and severally liable for the 
amount of tax due, regardless of the source of income reported and notwithstanding the fact that one spouse 
may be less informed about the contents of the return.”) (citation omitted), aff'g 55 T.C.M. (CCH) 135; Estate 
of Woodward v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo 1995-523 (“The privilege of filing a joint income tax return does not 
come without a price, however.  Thus, as a general rule, spouses who file joint income tax returns are jointly 
and severally liable for the full amount of tax due on the combined incomes.”). 
76 As mentioned in note 4, supra, in almost all cases married taxpayers face a higher liability if they 
elect the married filing separately status.  This holds true for two high-earners, who face a penalty on a 
married filing joint return relative to what two unmarried taxpayers would pay in the aggregate yet would be 
subject to an even higher liability if they elected married filing separately status. 
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and more efficient to treat each taxpayer as responsible for his or her own income tax 
liability?  An overview of innocent spouse relief will provide context to these questions. 
A. Evolution of Innocent Spouse Relief: 1971-1998 
For decades prior to 1971, spouses who filed joint returns were held jointly liable 
for any resulting deficiency or underpayment.  To avoid joint liability, a spouse had to 
show that there was no valid joint return.  Forgery was one possible defense; where a 
court found that a signature was forged, it concluded that there was no joint return filed.77  
Another possible defense was duress, with taxpayers arguing that a return is not joint in 
the absence of both parties’ voluntary consent.  Courts acknowledged that duress would 
be a defense to a joint liability if it was shown that the duress existed at the time the 
return was signed; however, courts defined duress narrowly and taxpayers were typically 
unsuccessful in their duress claims.78   
In cases where a spouse willingly signed the return, courts had no avenue to 
provide relief from joint liability, no matter how sympathetic the facts.  For example, in 
Scudder v. Commissioner, which predated the enactment of the first innocent spouse 
provision, the petitioner signed a joint return but was unaware that her husband had 
embezzled money and not reported it on the return.  The Service held her jointly liable 
for the resulting deficiency, and the Tax Court, “with considerable reluctance,” upheld 
the determination: 
Although we have much sympathy for petitioner's unhappy situation and 
are appalled at the harshness of this result in the instant case, the 
inflexible statute leaves no room for amelioration. It would seem that 
only remedial legislation can soften the impact of the rule of strict 
individual liability for income taxes on the many married women who 
are unknowingly subjected to its provisions by filing joint returns.79 
This plea did not go unheard.  The Innocent Spouse Act of 197180 was said to 
have reflected the concern of Congress “about the ‘grave injustice’ imposed by joint and 
                                                     
77 See e.g., Dranow v. Comm’r, 27 T.C.M. (CCH) 1485 (1968).  Forgery is to be distinguished from 
signing someone else’s name with tacit consent.  Thus if one spouse signs for the other, the court will uphold 
joint liability where it finds that the non-signing spouse tacitly consented to the signing spouse’s action.  See, 
e.g., Abrams v. Comm’r, 53 T.C. 230 (1969). 
78 See e.g., Stanley v. Comm’r, 45 T.C. 555, 563 (1966) (holding that the taxpayer  “failed to prove 
the necessary causal relationship between her fear of [her husband]  and her signing of the returns”); 
Federbush v. Comm’r, 34 T.C. 740, 754–58 (1960), aff’d per curiam, 325 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1963); Estate of 
Aylesworth v. Comm’r, 24 T.C. 134, 145–46 (1955) (holding that taxpayer’s abuse at the hands of her 
husband did not constitute duress).  The Aylesworth opinion noted: “The filing of joint returns resulted in a 
substantially reduced tax burden for the couple as a result of the split income provisions, and we should be 
very slow to conclude that the signature of the wife is to be regarded as having been obtained by fraud or 
duress.”  Id. at 146.  
79 Scudder v. Comm’r, 48 T.C. 36, 41 (1967).  Mrs. Scudder appealed to the Sixth Circuit Court of 
Appeals, which disagreed with the Tax Court that nothing could be done.  It remanded the case for further 
consideration of the innocence of the fraud as a defense.  Scudder v. Comm’r, 405 F.2d 222 (6th Cir. 1968).  
Another oft-cited case that included a plea for a legislative fix is Wissing v. Comm'r, 54 T.C. 1428, 1432 
(1970) (“We would welcome a rule which would grant relief to a victimized spouse who has no knowledge of 
or reason to have knowledge of, and does not benefit from, unreported income, at least where that income is 
the fruit of a crime.  But we regretfully see no way in which this Court can or should engraft such a ‘doing 
equity’ rule on the language of section 6013(d)(3).  We think that such a result should properly be 
accomplished by ameliorating legislation.”), vacated, 441 F.2d 533 (6th Cir. 1971). 
80 Innocent Spouse Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 91-679, 84 Stat. 2063.  In 1998, the innocent spouse 
provisions were amended and moved to § 6015, where they remain today. 




several liability in cases in which, for example, the culpable spouse embezzles funds, 
fails to report the proceeds, deserts the innocent spouse, and squanders the funds.”81  The 
legislative history to the 1971 Act recognized the inequitable outcomes that sometimes 
resulted from strict joint and several liability.  The Senate Report on the bill noted that 
“some . . . judicial decisions have carried pleas for legislative relief” and quoted the 
above language from the Tax Court’s opinion in Scudder as an example.82  The report 
stated that “[t]his proposal seeks to correct the unfairness in the situations brought to the 
attention of this committee and to bring government tax collection practices into accord 
with basic principles of equity and fairness.”83  
To address these concerns, the 1971 Act added subsection (e) to § 6013, 
providing potential relief for a spouse who had filed jointly if: (1) there was omitted 
income in excess of twenty-five percent of the amount of the gross income reported on 
the return; (2) this omitted amount was attributable to one spouse; (3) the other spouse 
establishes that he or she did not know of, and had no reason to know of, such omission; 
and (4) it would be inequitable to hold the other spouse liable for the deficiency 
attributable to such omission, taking into account all facts and circumstances, including 
whether or not the other spouse significantly benefited directly or indirectly from the 
items omitted from gross income.  
The notion of an “innocent” spouse has evolved considerably over time, just as 
the statutory provisions for relief have been liberalized.  To qualify for relief under the 
1971 Act, one truly had to be uninvolved in, and unaware of, his or her spouse’s financial 
activities and resulting understatement of income on the joint return.  Moreover, relief 
was only available if the spouse omitted twenty-five percent or more of his or her income 
on the return; an otherwise innocent spouse had no relief if the omission were smaller.  
Since its narrowly defined introduction in 1971, the grounds for innocent spouse relief 
have been increasingly liberalized though legislative amendment and case law.  Contrast 
the 1971 standard for innocent spouse relief with that now available under § 6015(f), 
enacted in 1998, which affords a taxpayer relief if, “taking into account all the facts and 
circumstances, it is inequitable to hold the individual liable for any unpaid tax or any 
deficiency (or any portion of either).”84 
Over time, Congress recognized that the early versions of innocent spouse relief 
were “narrowly drawn and strictly interpreted” and that many former spouses did not 
qualify for those protections.85  As part of the 1996 Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2 (TBOR2), 
Congress directed the Treasury Department and U.S. Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) to study whether the then-current innocent spouse provisions were providing 
“meaningful relief in all cases where such relief is appropriate.”86  It also called for 
studies of: (1) the effects of changing the liability on joint returns from joint and several 
liability to proportionate liability (meaning “each spouse would be liable only for the 
income tax attributable to the income of each spouse”87); and (2) the effects of providing 
                                                     
81 STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, 105TH CONG., PRESENT LAW AND BACKGROUND RELATING TO 
TAX TREATMENT OF “INNOCENT SPOUSES” (Joint Comm. Print 1998) (citing S. REP. No. 91-1537, at 2 (1970)). 
82 S. REP. NO. 91-1537, at 2 (1970). 
83 Id. 
84 I.R.C. § 6015(f)(1) (2012). 
85 H.R. REP. NO. 104-506, at 30 (1996).   
86 Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2, Pub. L. No. 104-168, § 401 (1996). 
87 H.R. REP. NO. 104-506, at 31 (1996).  
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that the Service must be bound in its collection by the allocation of joint liability agreed 
upon in a divorce decree.88   
Prior to the passage of TBOR2, the Treasury Department requested public 
comment on these questions.89  In response, the American Bar Association (ABA) and 
the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) were among the groups 
that submitted proposals suggesting how joint and several liability should be replaced 
with proportionate liability.  
In February 1998, the Treasury Department issued its report to Congress.90  The 
report concluded that the existing innocent spouse provisions “may not provide 
‘meaningful relief in all cases where such relief is appropriate,’”91 and it carefully 
considered the alternatives to joint and several liability, including the ABA and AICPA 
proposals.  However, the report ultimately rejected those proposals and recommended 
further modifying the innocent spouse provisions “to accommodate more cases” rather 
than making fundamental changes to the joint and several liability standard.92  
Congress undertook this task in 1998.  In January and February of that year, the 
Senate Finance Committee held hearings in which innocent spouse reform was one of a 
number of items examined.93  The resulting compromise between the House and Senate, 
§ 3201 of the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998,94 became the new § 6015 of the 
Code.  The new section provided alternative forms of relief in three different subsections: 
6015(b), (c), and (f).  Section 6015(b) is a liberalized version of the “traditional” innocent 
spouse relief applicable to joint filers who could establish that they had no actual or 
constructive knowledge of the item for the understatement from which they sought relief. 
Section 6015(c) allows an innocent spouse to elect an allocation of the 
deficiency95 such that his or her liability is limited to the portion of the deficiency 
attributable only to items allocable to the taxpayer.  The electing spouse must be 
widowed or divorced, legally separated, or living apart (for at least twelve months) from 
the spouse with whom he or she filed the joint return.  The subsection includes anti-abuse 
provisions to address fraudulent transfers of assets.  The innocent spouse cannot have had 
actual knowledge that the item giving rise to the deficiency was reported incorrectly;96 
however, unlike with traditional innocent spouse relief and the expanded § 6015(b), 
§ 6015(c)(3)(C) puts the burden of proof on the Service to show that the requesting 
spouse had actual knowledge.  Moreover, a requesting spouse who had actual knowledge 
                                                     
88 Id. 
89 I.R.S. Notice 96-19, 1996-1 C.B. 371. 
90 See generally 1998 TREAS. REPORT ON JL & IS, supra note 22. 
91 Id. at 57 (quoting Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2, supra note 86). 
92 See id. at 58.  Part III will examine the Treasury Department’s arguments in favor of maintaining 
the joint and several liability standard. 
93 See IRS Restructuring: Hearings on H.R. 2676 Before the S. Comm. on Fin.,105th Cong. (1998). 
94 IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, H.R. 2676, 105th Cong. § 3201 (1998) (enacted) 
[hereinafter 1998 Act]; I.R.C. § 6015 (2012). 
95 The final version of the bill did not allow for separation of liability for underpayments, as had 
been proposed by the Senate amendment.  However, relief for underpayments was made available in 
§ 6015(f). 
96 See Svetlana Attestatova, The Bonds of Joint Tax Liability Should Not Be Stronger than 
Marriage: Congressional Intent Behind § 6015(c) Separation of Liability Relief, 78 WASH. L. REV. 831, 858 
(2003) (including an in-depth examination of the meaning of “any item”).  




can overcome this requirement if the spouse is able to establish that he or she signed the 
return under duress.97 
In addition to these two specific, carefully designed statutory provisions, 
Congress also added § 6015(f), which provides the Treasury Secretary authority to 
prescribe procedures for relief from joint and several liability if, “taking into account all 
the facts and circumstances, it is inequitable to hold the individual liable for any unpaid 
tax or any deficiency.”98  A taxpayer is not eligible for relief under § 6015(f) unless relief 
is unavailable under §§ 6015(b) and (c).99  Significantly, § 6015(f) is the only provision 
that contemplates relief for an innocent spouse in the case of an underpayment.  An 
underpayment can result when the taxpayer files a correct return indicating a liability due, 
but encloses only partial payment or no payment at all.  The conference report explains 
the intention “that equitable relief be available to a spouse that does not know, and had no 
reason to know, that funds intended for the payment of tax were instead taken by the 
other spouse for such other spouse’s benefit.”100  
Given its statutory authority under § 6015, the Service developed administrative 
guidance for how it would grant § 6015(f) relief.101  Over time, a combination of this and 
subsequent administrative guidance, Tax Court opinions, and minor amendments to 
§ 6015 have contributed to a further liberalization of the rules favoring innocent spouses. 
B. A Long Way Since Scudder – Further Liberalization of Innocent Spouse 
Relief: 1998-2012 
The 1998 Act was intended to expand innocent spouse relief and “provide 
equitable relief in appropriate situations.”102  Over the past fourteen years, the Service has 
undertaken administrative efforts to further improve the process.  To name just a few 
examples, the Service: (1) developed and revised Form 8857;103 (2) centralized the 
processing and review of the requests in one location—the Covington, Kentucky, 
Innocent Spouse Unit;104 and (3) revised letters, publications, and online tools to make 
married taxpayers more aware of the consequences of joint filing and the availability of 
innocent spouse relief.105  And in the past fourteen years, spouses who feel it is unfair to 
                                                     
97 Prior to 1998, duress was (and still is) a common law defense to joint and several liability.  See 
supra note 78.  
98 I.R.C. § 6015(f)(1) (2012).   
99 I.R.C. § 6015(f)(2) (2012). 
100 H.R. REP. No. 105-599, at 254 (1998) (Conf. Rep.). 
101 The current guidelines are set out in Rev. Proc. 2003-61, 2003-2 C.B. 296, which superseded 
Revenue Procedure 2000-15, 2000-1 C.B. 447.  Notice 2012-8, 2012-4 I.R.B. 309, introduced a proposed 
revenue procedure that, if adopted, will supersede Revenue Procedure 2003-61.  See also Treas. Reg. 
§ 1.6015-5 (2002).  
102 H.R. REP. No. 105-599, at 254 (1998) (Conf. Rep.). 
103 The first version of IRS Form 8857, Request for Innocent Spouse Relief (And Separation of 
Liability and Equitable Relief), was released in December 1998 and was a one page form with three pages of 
instructions.  The form has been revised five times since then and is currently under revision again.  The most 
recent version of the form (Rev. September 2010) is four pages long and includes five pages of separate 
instructions.  All versions are available at http://www.irs.gov/uac/Form-8857,-Request-for-Innocent-Spouse-
Relief. 
104 The Cincinnati Centralized Innocent Spouse Operation (CCISO) is located in Covington, 
Kentucky, and was established in fiscal year 2001.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-02-558, 
INNOCENT SPOUSE PROGRAM PERFORMANCE IMPROVED; BALANCED PERFORMANCE MEASURES NEEDED 4 
(2002). 
105 See, e.g., NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, THE MOST SERIOUS PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED BY 
TAXPAYERS, FY 2001 ANN. REP. TO CONG. 67–68.  IRS Publication 971, Innocent Spouse Relief, was 
originally released in 1998 and revised six times since.  The current version (Rev. September 2011) is 24 
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be held jointly liable have responded in kind.  The Service receives an estimated fifty 
thousand requests for innocent spouse relief annually and grants fewer than half of these 
requests. 106  
Following its grant of authority in § 6015(f), the Service developed guidance 
explaining its standards for determining equitable relief.  Revenue Procedure 2003-61107 
set out seven threshold eligibility requirements for equitable relief108 and specified 
circumstances in which equitable relief ordinarily will be granted.109  Taxpayers who 
meet the threshold eligibility requirements but not the specified conditions of section 4.02 
might still qualify for relief; the Service can consider all facts and circumstances and 
grant relief if it finds it inequitable to hold the requesting spouse liable for all or part of 
the deficiency or underpayment.110  The balancing factors include: marital status; 
economic hardship; legal obligation of the nonrequesting spouse; whether the requesting 
spouse benefited significantly from the unpaid liability or item giving rise to the 
deficiency; the requesting spouse’s compliance with income tax laws; spousal abuse; and 
mental or physical health of the requesting spouse.111 
Interestingly, another of the balancing factors that the Service will consider in 
determining equitable relief is whether the requesting spouse knew or had reason to know 
of the underpayment or item giving rise to the understatement.112  This is a significant 
departure from the pre-1998 innocent spouse relief statute, which required a spouse to 
show no knowledge or reason have knowledge as one of several conditions for relief.  
Under the equitable relief standard, the Service (or the Tax Court, in its review) can now 
grant relief from liability to a spouse who had full knowledge of the wrongdoing when he 
or she signed the return if it feels that the other factors supporting relief warrant it.   
Returning to the Bozick case as an example:113 both the Service and the Tax 
Court concluded that Ms. Bozick had reason to know that her husband would not pay the 
$137,453 liability shown on their joint return.  The record shows Ms. Bozick was aware 
that he was in failing health, had credit card debt, and had a gambling problem.  She 
acknowledged these facts in her divorce petition and also acknowledged that he did not 
keep up with his quarterly taxes and withholding.  The Tax Court weighed all facts and 
circumstances in its opinion, including the relief factors listed in Revenue Procedure 
2003-61, but was perhaps most persuaded that it was fair to grant her relief by the fact 
that “Bozick signed a joint tax return only after having been browbeaten into doing so by 
her husband and after having filed a separate return.”114 
                                                                                                                                                 
pages long.  The instructions to Form 1040 (Tax Year 2011) include an explanation of joint and several 
liability and information about Innocent Spouse Relief; however, at 189 pages, it cannot be assured that 
taxpayers will read this information in the instructions at the time of filing.  The Service developed an online 
Innocent Spouse Tax Relief Eligibility Explorer, which is available on the IRS website at 
http://www.irs.gov/Individuals/Explore-if-you-are-an-Eligible-Innocent-Spouse. 
106 See supra note 19. 
107 Rev. Proc. 2003-61, 2003-2 C.B. 296. 
108 Id. at § 4.01. 
109 Id. at § 4.02. 
110 Id. at § 4.03 (providing a nonexclusive list of eight factors that the Service will consider in 
making its determination).   
111 Id. 
112 Id. 
113 See supra note 9. 
114 Bozick v. Comm’r, 99 T.C.M. (CCH) 1242, 1244 (2010). 




A lot of open questions remained after the 1998 Act, even after the Service 
developed its administrative guidance for granting relief.  For example, in the years 
immediately following the 1998 Act, the Service contended that the Tax Court lacked 
jurisdiction to review a denial of equitable relief brought under § 6015(f).  The Tax Court 
found that it did have jurisdiction over these cases.115  However, in 2006, the Ninth 
Circuit held that the Court lacked jurisdiction in § 6015(f) underpayment cases where the 
liability did not arise from a deficiency.116  In December 2006, Congress settled this issue 
by amending § 6015(e) to make clear that the Tax Court had jurisdiction to review all 
denials of relief, including § 6015(f) underpayment cases.117 
The scope and standard of judicial review have been the subject of litigation in 
recent years, with the Tax Court holding that the scope of review could include new 
evidence introduced by the taxpayer at trial that was not in the administrative record118 
and that the proper standard of review in all § 6015 relief cases is de novo.119  Despite 
Tax Court decisions to the contrary,120 the Service continues to argue that the scope of 
review of § 6015(f) cases should be limited to the administrative record and that abuse of 
discretion is the proper standard of review.121 
The cumulative impact of the 1998 Act, the 1996 amendment to § 6015(e), and 
the Tax Court holdings on the scope and standard of review has been a great 
liberalization and expansion of innocent spouse relief over a fourteen year period.  This 
was, of course, what Congress had intended when it decided in 1998 to broaden the relief 
rather than eliminate joint and several liability.  But to achieve “equitable” outcomes, 
each determination necessarily becomes a very fact-intensive inquiry into the personal 
lives and marriage of the taxpayers.  If the nonrequesting spouse responds or intervenes, 
                                                     
115 See, e.g., Fernandez v. Comm’r, 114 T.C. 324, 332 (2000); Ewing v. Comm’r, 122 T.C. 32, 36–
38 (2004).  
116 Comm’r v. Ewing, 439 F.3d 1009, 1014 (9th Cir. 2006); see also Bartman v. Comm’r, 446 F.3d 
785, 787–88 (8th Cir. 2006) (holding that the Tax Court lacked jurisdiction under § 6015(e)(1) where there 
was no deficiency). 
117 I.R.C. § 6015(e)(1)(A) (2012).   
118 Ewing v. Comm’r, 122 T.C. 32 (2004), vacated, 439 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir. 2006).  In Porter v. 
Comm’r, 130 T.C. 115, 124 (2008) [hereinafter Porter I], the Tax Court revisited the issue and upheld the 
position that the court may consider evidence introduced at trial even if not included in the administrative 
record.  Porter I addressed the scope of review question, but did not resolve the standard of review question; 
it stated that determination of the scope of review did not depend on the standard of review applied.  Porter I, 
130 T.C. at 122 n.10.   
119 See Porter v. Comm’r, 132 T.C. 203 (2009) [hereinafter Porter II] (revisiting the standard of 
review question in § 6015(f) cases).  Following the 1998 Act, the court used the de novo standard of review 
in §§ 6015(b) and (c) cases, but held in Butler v. Comm’r, 114 T.C. 276, 292 (2000) that abuse of discretion 
was the appropriate standard of review in § 6015(f) equitable relief cases.  In Porter II, the court revisited this 
question in light of Congress’s 2006 amendments to § 6015(e)(1); it concluded that by the language of the 
amendments, Congress intended the court to use a de novo scope of review and standard of review in cases 
determining relief under § 6015(f).  Porter II, 132 T.C. at 208.  But see the dissent in Porter II, arguing that 
Congress did not intend in its 2006 amendment to § 6015(e) to change the court’s standard of review from 
abuse of discretion to de novo.  Porter II, 132 T.C. at 233–35 (Gustafson, J., dissenting). 
120 NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, LEGISLATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS 1, 2011 ANN. REP. TO CONG. 
534–35 (2011) (citing as an example Torrisi v. Comm’r, T.C.M. 2011-235, slip op. at 17 n.15).  The 
Taxpayer Advocate called upon Congress to amend § 6015 to clarify that the Tax Court’s scope and standard 
of review is de novo in § 6015(f) cases, stating: “[t]he IRS’s position is especially harmful to taxpayers who 
cannot afford representation or assistance during administrative proceedings, or those who are victims of 
domestic violence or abuse.  The divergence between Counsel’s position and that of the Tax Court creates 
uncertainty for taxpayers and consumes administrative and judicial resources.”  Id. at 474. 
121 I.R.S. Notice CC-2009-021 (June 30, 2009). 
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the Service and/or the Tax Court often must make a judgment in a “he-said, she-said” 
presentation by the spouses.122 
And as already noted, the liberalization of the statute does not mean that all or 
even most requesting spouses get the relief they seek.  The Taxpayer Advocate’s 2011 
Annual Report to Congress included an analysis of forty-three opinions from the Tax 
Court or Courts of Appeals involving relief under § 6015 for the period June 1, 2010 to 
May 31, 2011.123  Of these forty-three cases, most (thirty-four cases, or 79%) involved a 
reconsideration of the merits as to whether the taxpayer should be granted relief.124  Of 
these cases decided on the merits, the taxpayer was granted full relief in eleven of thirty-
four cases (or 32%) and partial relief in seven cases (21%).  The Service’s denial of relief 
was fully upheld by the court in nearly half the cases (sixteen of thirty-four, or 47%).125 
A significant number of the forty-three cases analyzed in 2011—fifteen cases, or 
35%—involved procedural questions.  This is common from year to year.  The Lantz 
case126 sparked a closely-watched bout of litigation concerning procedure for innocent 
spouse relief cases, which eventually led to yet another liberalization of the relief process.  
At issue in Lantz was whether a requesting spouse must request equitable relief under 
§ 6015(f) within two years of the Service commencing collection activity on the 
requesting spouse.  The Code is clear that a taxpayer requesting relief under § 6015(b) or 
(c) must do so within this two-year limit,127 but it is silent as to whether there is a time 
limit for a taxpayer requesting relief under § 6015(f).  Treasury Regulation 1.6015-
5(b)(1), which was promulgated in 2002, extended this two-year limit to taxpayers 
seeking equitable relief under § 6015(f).128  In Lantz¸ the Service had rejected the 
taxpayer’s § 6015(f) claim as untimely because it was not within the two-year limit.  The 
taxpayer argued that regulation section 1.6015-5(b)(1) was an invalid interpretation of the 
statute; the Tax Court agreed, found an abuse of discretion because the Service did not 
consider the merits of the taxpayer’s request, and ordered further proceedings to 
determine whether the taxpayer was entitled to relief.129  The Service appealed to the 
Seventh Circuit, which reversed and remanded in 2010.130  In cases that would have been 
appealed to a Court of Appeals that has not followed the Seventh Circuit, the Tax Court 
continued to hold that the two-year deadline imposed by the Treasury Regulation was 
                                                     
122 I.R.C. § 6015(h)(2) (2012) provides the nonrequesting spouse the statutory right to respond.  
While an important procedural safeguard, the process puts the Service into the position of fact-finder in a 
“he-said, she-said” argument between ex-spouses.  Should the requesting spouse prevail, the nonrequesting 
spouse has the right to appeal.  Rev. Proc. 2003-19, 2003-1 C.B. 371. 
123 NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, MOST LITIGATED ISSUES 2, 2011 ANN. REP. TO. CONG. 659 (2011).  
124 Id. 
125 Id. 
126 Lantz v. Comm’r, 607 F.3d 479 (7th Cir. 2010).  
127 See I.R.C. § 6015 (2012).  “Collection activity” is defined in Treas. Reg. § 1.6015-5(b)(2)(i) 
(2002) to mean: “a section 6330 notice; an offset of an overpayment of the requesting spouse against a 
liability under section 6402; the filing of a suit by the United States against the requesting spouse for the 
collection of the joint tax liability; or the filing of a claim by the United States in a court proceeding in which 
the requesting spouse is a party or which involves property of the requesting spouse.” 
128 Prior to the promulgation of the regulation, the Service issued several forms of public guidance 
announcing its position that the two-year limitation applied to § 6015(f) claims.  See I.R.S. Notice 98-61, 
§ 3.01(3), 1998-2 C.B. 758; Rev. Proc. 2000-15, 2000-1 C.B. 447; Rev. Proc. 2003-61, 2003-2 C.B. 296. 
129 Lantz v. Comm’r, 132 T.C. 131, 150 (2009), rev’d, 607 F.3d 479 (7th Cir. 2010). 
130 Lantz v. Comm’r, 607 F.3d 479 (7th Cir. 2010). 




invalid.131  The Service, meanwhile, continued to appeal in other circuits and win on the 
issue.132  
The two Lantz decisions attracted considerable attention among practitioners and 
academics.133  The Taxpayer Advocate highlighted this particular issue in her 2010 
Annual Report to Congress, criticizing the two-year limit and calling upon Congress to 
amend § 6015(f) to clarify that a taxpayer may request equitable relief at any time before 
expiration of the period of limitations on collection.134  Her recommendation gained 
momentum in Congress, with members of the House and Senate sending letters to IRS 
Commissioner Schulman calling upon the Service to reconsider the Treasury Regulation 
in light of the intent of the 1998 Act.  Senator Baucus, who was a member of the Finance 
Committee at the time of the 1998 Act, stated in a press release that accompanied one 
letter to Shulman: 
We made important changes to protect innocent taxpayers seeking relief 
from their spouses’ liability to ensure fair and equitable treatment.  Now, 
we are concerned this two-year limitation denies relief to the very 
taxpayers the law was designed to help—the innocent spouses unaware 
of these IRS collection activities because of intimidation or deception by 
their spouse.  We must reevaluate these limits so all taxpayers are treated 
justly and have time to file for tax relief they deserve.135 
The letters proved effective.  In July 2011, the Service announced that it would 
eliminate the two-year requirement in § 6015(f) cases; it will consider requests for 
equitable relief if the statutory period for collection remains open.136  Commissioner 
Shulman stated in the accompanying press release: “today’s change will help innocent 
spouses victimized in the past, present, and future.”137  In the year prior to this change in 
policy, over fifteen hundred requests were disallowed as untimely because relief was not 
                                                     
131 The Tax Court follows the precedent of a Court of Appeals in subsequent cases that would be 
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light of I.R.S. Notice 2011-70, 2011-32 I.R.B. 135 (infra note 136).  See Coulter v. Comm’r, T.C. No. 1003-
09 (stipulated decision Nov. 20, 2009), appeal docketed, No. 10-680 (2nd Cir. Feb. 24, 2010); Buckner v. 
Comm’r, T.C. No. 12153-09 (decided May 21, 2010), appeal docketed, No. 10-2056 (6th Cir. Aug. 18, 
2010); and Carlile v. Comm’r, T.C. No. 011567-09 (decided May 26, 2010), appeal docketed, No. 10-72578 
(9th Cir. Aug. 23, 2010).  Despite the appeals, the Tax Court continued to hold the two-year deadline invalid 
in the circuits that had not yet ruled.  See, e.g., Pullins v. Comm’r, 136 T.C. 432, 441–42 (2011); Kelly v. 
Comm’r, 100 T.C.M. (CCH) 507, 510 (2010); Hall v. Comm’r, 135 T.C. 374, 382 (2010).  Pullins was on 
appeal in the Eighth Circuit, and both Kelly and Hall were on appeal in the Sixth Circuit; these Tax Court 
opinions were filed subsequent to the Buckner opinion but prior to I.R.S. Notice 2011-70.   
133 See, e.g., Patrick J. Smith, Gaps in the Seventh Circuit’s Reasoning in Lantz, 2010 TAX NOTES 
TODAY 186-19 (2010) (criticizing the Seventh Circuit opinion); Bryan T. Camp, Interpreting Statutory 
Silence, 2010 TAX NOTES TODAY 148-6 (2010) (analyzing the Tax Court’s decision). 
134 See NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, ALLOW TAXPAYERS TO REQUEST EQUITABLE RELIEF UNDER 
INTERNAL REVENUE CODE 6015(F) OR 66(C) AT ANY TIME BEFORE EXPIRATION OF THE PERIOD OF LIMITATIONS 
ON COLLECTION AND TO RAISE INNOCENT SPOUSE RELIEF AS A DEFENSE IN COLLECTION ACTIONS 1, 2010 ANN. 
REP. TO CONG. 377–78 (2010).  
135 Press Release, S. Fin. Comm., Baucus, Harkin, Sherrod Brown Call on IRS to Give Innocent 
Spouses More Time to File For Tax Relief (Apr. 18, 2011). 
136 I.R.S. Notice 2011-70, 2011-32 I.R.B. 135. 
137 I.R.S. News Release IR-2011-80 (July 25, 2011).  
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requested within the two-year limit.138  The new guidance is a taxpayer friendly 
outcome—and good for a spouse like Ms. Lantz, whose case would have granted relief 
on the merits if it had been requested timely—as it will once again broaden the 
circumstances for relief.  An accompanying increase in requests, however, will further 
burden a system that already receives fifty thousand such requests annually. 
A few months later, in January 2012, the Service released Notice 2012-8, which 
introduced a proposed revenue procedure that would update and supersede Revenue 
Procedure 2003-61.139  In the press release accompanying the notice, IRS Commissioner 
Doug Shulman stated, “The IRS is significantly changing the way we determine innocent 
spouse relief. These improvements should dramatically enhance our process to make it 
fairer for victimized taxpayers facing difficult situations.”140  The notice proposes a 
procedure for certain streamlined case determinations,141 which sounds as though the 
Service intends to add efficiency to the process.  However, it does not specify what is 
meant by “streamlined.”  At the same time, another section of the proposed revenue 
procedure expands how the Service can weigh abuse and financial control in cases 
involving an underpayment;142 while this potentially broadens the grounds for relief for 
innocent spouses, it could also make the determination even more fact-intensive. 
The innocent spouse relief process has evolved considerably since its debut in 
1971.  Relief has been expanded to include more taxpayers, and the taxpayers have been 
granted more extensive rights of appeal.  From a due process standpoint, these evolutions 
are admirable.  Congress is sympathetic to the plight of the “innocent spouse,” as was 
made clear in the hearings and legislative history relating to the 1998 Act and again 
recently by Senator Baucus.143  So in light of the complicated and time-consuming relief 
process, why has Congress chosen not to fix the root of the problem by eliminating joint 
and several liability?  Part IV will offer some perspective, with the benefit of hindsight. 
IV. SOLUTIONS – REVISITING THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT’S 
RECOMMENDATION TO EXPAND INNOCENT SPOUSE RELIEF 
INSTEAD OF ELIMINATE JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY  
In 1996, Congress directed the Treasury Department to conduct a study of four 
issues related to joint returns.  The three that are relevant to this article included: (1) the 
effects of changing from a joint and several liability standard to a proportionate liability 
standard; (2) the effects of allowing the Service to be bound in collections efforts by the 
allocation of joint liability in a divorce decree; (3) whether the innocent spouse 
provisions in effect at the time “provided meaningful relief in all cases where the relief 
was appropriate.”144 
The Treasury Department report, which was released in February of 1998, 
acknowledged that the existing joint and several liability and innocent spouse rules were 
“imperfect in certain respects.”145  It considered the pros and cons of a number of various 
proposals to modify or eliminate joint and several liability, and concluded that each of the 
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proposals had both advantages and defects.  The Treasury report opted instead to 
recommend legislative changes that would “preserve the advantages of the current system 
and yet afford innocent spouse relief in more situations.”146  Specifically, it recommended 
legislation that would broaden relief in the following ways:  
Automatically suspend collection efforts against one spouse when the 
other is contesting a proposed joint assessment in Tax Court; Make 
innocent spouse relief easier to obtain by changing statutory standards to 
help additional taxpayers, including those with smaller tax bills who are 
presently ineligible for relief in many cases; Give more taxpayers who are 
denied innocent spouse relief by the IRS an opportunity to appeal the 
decision to Tax Court, and automatically suspending collection while the 
Tax Court considered the appeal.147  
Before reaching that conclusion and making those recommendations for 
legislative change, the Treasury report considered several alternatives.  The report 
considered the specific advantages and disadvantages of each proposal, including the 
proposal that I advocate for in Part V of the article: to mandate separate returns for all 
married individuals, thereby eliminating both joint and several liability and joint returns.    
A. A Systemic Change: Mandatory Separate Returns for all Fliers  
The report considered the advantages and disadvantages of adopting a mandatory 
separate return system from the perspective of both the taxpayer and the Service.  
Mandated separate return filing is my favored solution because I believe it is unfair to 
force married filers to choose between joint liability and unfavorable tax treatment.  The 
report commented in a footnote that mandated separate filing would “arguably be 
inconsistent with horizontal equity, one of the economic goals of taxation, because 
similar families would be taxed differently based on the division of income between 
spouses.”148  As I argue below, this argument is antiquated in that it presumes that a 
family unit consists of a married couple.  
Another primary concern the report raised for taxpayers is that mandated separate 
filing would increase the administrative burden for couples, who would have to file two 
tax returns annually instead of one joint return.  The report noted that this would be 
especially burdensome for couples with jointly held income-producing assets or jointly 
held assets, such as a primary residence, that create a deduction.149  It noted that because 
a comparatively small number of taxpayers choose the “married filing separately” status, 
questions arising in those cases were addressed on a case-by-case basis, but that if 
mandated separate filing were adopted, then “[c]omprehensive rules would need to be 
implemented, most likely through legislation, to instruct taxpayers and the Service on 
how to allocate any number of items between the spouses.”150  Perhaps because the 
numbers are insignificant relative to joint filers, the report does not address the situation 
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147 Id. at 3.  The report also addressed issues related to community property laws and the rule of 
Poe v. Seaborn.  I have largely ignored the effect of community property laws in this article because I 
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in which unmarried people own income-producing property jointly, yet file an individual 
return. 
From the perspective of IRS administration, the report noted that mandatory 
separate filing would be burdensome insofar as the Service would have to process forty-
nine million additional tax returns annually.  However, as I discussed in Part II.B, the IRS 
e-file program has helped to streamline return processing, and the number of taxpayers 
participating in the e-file program has nearly quadrupled since 1998.151 
B. Less Comprehensive Proposals: Proportionate Liability, Allocated 
Liability, and Adoption of the Divorce Decree 
Another line of proposals in the Treasury report contemplated preserving joint 
filing while allowing married couples to separate their joint liability.  For example, the 
ABA Tax Section Committee on Domestic Relations proposed what became known as 
“back end proportionate liability,” whereby a married couple could allocate and separate 
a tax liability or assessment in two situations: (1) upon election by one spouse in the case 
of an underpayment; and (2) “upon the assertion of a deficiency of tax” during an 
exam.152  Thus, married couples would continue to enjoy the benefits of income splitting 
but in many cases could avoid joint liability attributable to the tax items of the other 
spouse.  AICPA introduced a different proposal, which became known as the “Allocated 
Liability Standard,” which would permit married taxpayers to file jointly and provide, at 
their complete discretion, their own agreed-upon allocation of the aggregate liability at 
filing.153  The report rejected both the ABA and AICPA proposals on the grounds that 
neither would fully eliminate the need for equitable or innocent spouse relief.154   
A third proposal would require the Service to be bound by the terms of a divorce 
decree regarding the responsibility for tax liabilities on prior joint returns.  Congress had 
considered such a proposal previously but was troubled by the fact that the Service is not 
a party to the divorce proceeding.155 
C. Judging With the Benefit of Hindsight – Did Treasury Make the Right 
Recommendation in 1998?  The Unending Inefficiencies of the Innocent 
Spouse Process 
Ultimately, in 1998 Congress followed the report’s recommendations and 
retained joint and several liability while expanding the grounds for innocent spouse relief.  
In hindsight, was this the right decision? 
The report raised legitimate concerns about the increased administrative costs to 
both the taxpayer and the Service if a mandatory separate filing service were adopted.  
However, since the time of the report, e-filing has changed the administrative landscape 
considerably.156  To the extent that return processing is increasingly automated, the 
number of returns filed is less relevant than it once was. 
Meanwhile, the expansion of innocent spouse reform has broadened the grounds 
for relief and created new administrative burdens.  The expansion has resulted in a 
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corresponding increase in the number of requests for innocent spouse relief, with each 
request requiring a time-consuming and personalized determination.  The Service and 
Tax Court are now expending significant resources to investigate claims of spousal 
abuse, economic hardship, and other highly factual non-tax questions such as an 
individual’s level of knowledge (i.e., which spouse knew what facts about items of 
income).157   
Unsurprisingly, given the task at hand, the Service has not been getting the 
results right.  In 2007, the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration (TIGTA) 
performed an audit to examine certain procedures that had been established to protect the 
rights of spouses requesting Innocent Spouse relief.158  Specifically, the procedures were 
designed to ensure that collection enforcement was suspended against the requesting 
spouse (but not against the nonrequesting spouse) while the relief request was pending; 
for example, while the request is under consideration, the requesting spouse’s refund 
should not be offset to satisfy the joint liability that is at issue.  However, TIGTA found 
that in twenty-seven percent of the accounts it reviewed, the Service had not acted timely 
to ensure that the proper protections were in place.159 
Richard C.E. Beck, who made a compelling argument for the repeal of joint and 
several liability in a 1990 article,160 re-examined the issue following the Restructuring 
and Reform Act of 1998.161  In his re-examination, Beck describes the high 
administrative costs of expanding innocent spouse relief in 1998 (as compared to 
abolishing joint and several liability).  Beck cites IRS statistics describing how the 
Service created a central processing center for Innocent Spouse claims and assigned 953 
full-time employees to work exclusively on those claims;162 despite this redirection of 
resources, it took the Service an average of 192 days to process claims for relief that were 
granted at the administrative level and it took an astounding 807 days to process claims 
that were appealed within the Service.163  Within the context of the significant resources 
the Service redirected toward innocent spouse relief, Beck examined the innocent spouse 
cases that were litigated in 2005 and found the following: 
Summing up, it seems fair to say that there are now more cases than 
before the 1998 reforms, and that the law and the decisions are more 
complex, but that there is no more certainty, consistency or rationality in 
the case law than before.  And because the ratio of wins and losses 
appears very similar in samples taken nearly twenty years apart, one may 
perhaps conclude also that the quality and consistency of the 
administrative dispositions are also no better now than before.164 
Beck argues that joint and several liability should be repealed because it is a 
system that lacks any justification and results in an intolerable “tax persecution of 
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women.”165  He points out that “[t]he United States is virtually the only country in the 
developed world which insists upon [joint and several liability], even among countries 
which permit income-splitting to married persons filing jointly.”166 
I agree with Beck that the 1998 expansion of innocent spouse relief was a failure.  
I believe that the Service should focus its resources on the proper administration of the 
tax law.  Congress should not expect the Service to investigate or judge intimate 
questions of family relations.  Similarly, these cases are a burden on the Tax Court’s 
docket, and the court is no better suited to determine “innocence” than the Service is.  
The extensive litigation and advocacy regarding the two-year rule in Lantz and its 
companion cases is only the latest example of the tremendous resources that have been 
poured into innocent spouse relief.  Beck argues that the innocent spouse rules will never 
be satisfactory, because “innocence is an irrational basis for relief and can never be made 
rigorous or consistent.”167   
In response to such critiques by Beck and other scholars, Stephanie Hunter 
McMahon conducted an empirical study of innocent spouse decisions to determine 
whether courts are implementing Congress’s legislative intent.168  She aggregated the 
results from 444 cases and concluded that “courts apply their own interpretation of 
congressional intent, only loosely confined by the terms provided by the executive 
agency.”169  McMahon elaborates on the courts’ interpretation of the factors set out by the 
Treasury Department in Revenue Procedure 2003-61 and describes some of the trends 
she found in her study.  She calls for clearer guidelines to be established by Congress and 
definitions by the Treasury Department, finding it problematic that “in their opinions 
judges are neither crafting precise definitions of many of . . . [the terms described in the 
Revenue Procedure] nor defining the relative importance of each.”170 
McMahon does not agree with Beck’s statement that innocent spouse relief has 
“degenerate[d] into a global subjective test of whether the spouse seeking relief can move 
the judge to sympathy,”171 but she does conclude from her study that litigating innocent 
spouse relief “can be complicated and costly for both taxpayers and the government” and 
that “[as] with all equity claims, the factors considered by the courts may be 
inconsistently applied.”172 
In my view, the Treasury Department’s solution of “afford[ing] innocent spouse 
relief in more situations”173 has fallen short in providing relief, while simultaneously 
burdening the system with time-consuming claims.  It is time for Congress to return to 
the drawing board and  reconsider the message that was delivered during the 1998 
testimony it heard from those who suffered because of joint liability. 
Instead of expecting the Code to resolve complex family dynamics, Congress 
should reassess and take a bold step in the opposite direction: it should stop 
differentiating taxpayers according to family dynamics.  Perhaps seventy-five years ago it 
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made sense for Congress to divide taxpayers into two distinct groups based on marital 
status.  But it is time for Congress to disentangle the Code from marital status, and this 
can be accomplished in harmony with a broader movement towards simplification of the 
Code.  The solution is to ignore marital status and, in doing so, to reject the long-accepted 
premise that married couples behave as one economic unit.174  
V. NEITHER THE CODE NOR AMERICA LOOKS LIKE IT DID IN 1938 (OR 
EVEN 1975): WHY CONGRESS SHOULD AGAIN REVISIT THE CALL 
FOR MANDATORY SEPARATE FILING 
As described in Part IV, there are many ways to address the problems that arise 
from joint and several liability.  Many of the solutions would not require large scale 
modifications to the Code.  One example, contemplated by the Treasury Department 
Report, is that Congress could require the Service to respect the allocation of tax liability 
for past years agreed upon in the divorce decree.175  The Service could create a one-page 
form on which the taxpayers could allocate the liability and sign as part of divorce 
proceedings; once submitted to the Service, the taxpayers’ accounts could be adjusted 
accordingly.176 
This solution would be simple to enact and relatively easy to administer; it is 
desirable insofar as it would eliminate the need for the innocent spouse process.177  
However, it would do so without a thoughtful reconsideration of the rationales of joint 
and several liability, the policy underlying marital rates, or the various grounds for 
penalizing taxpayers who file separately.  As I will describe in this part, tax policy has 
not kept pace with demographic changes in the United States and there are important 
reasons to reconsider the Code’s underlying assumptions about households. 
Moreover, the time is ripe for ambitious statutory changes.  Faced with a growing 
deficit and following the historic U.S. credit downgrade by Standard & Poor’s, there is 
talk among policymakers of fundamentally revisiting the Code.  Since 2010, 
commentators, politicians, and government officials have increasingly turned their 
collective attention to the national debt.  Several tax policy groups, including the 
bipartisan National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform established by 
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President Obama, have released tax reform recommendations.  They are united in calling 
for major changes to the Code with a move towards simplification—closing loopholes by 
eliminating certain deductions in order to broaden the base and in turn reduce individual 
rates.178  In that spirit, there may be a window of opportunity for fundamental, systemic 
changes to the Code.  The proposal to move to mandatory separate returns for all filers, a 
striking departure from the longstanding U.S. tax system that would eliminate the 
distinction between married and single filers, would fit within such a call for 
simplification and could be enacted as part of a broader overhaul of the Code. 
It is a new century; simply put, the United States does not look like it did in 1938 
when joint and several liability was adopted.  Importantly, neither does the Code.  There 
are many good policy reasons for Congress to revisit the Code’s overly simplistic 
assumptions about households.  After a brief examination of the current demographics, I 
will focus on the unfair conundrum faced by low-income families headed by married 
couples as one way in which the married filing jointly status is particularly antiquated and 
counter-productive in today’s America. 
A. A Closer Look at the Changing Demographics 
In 1993, Marjorie Kornhauser wrote about the demographic trends at that time, 
which were already reflecting “the decline of the traditional nuclear family and an 
increase in the number of divorces, single-parent families, nonmarried cohabitation, and 
two-earner families.”179  She noted that nonmarital households increased nearly four 
hundred percent from 1970 to March 1991, 180 leading her to re-examine the concept of 
“family.”  At the same time, Kornhauser examined the premise that married couples act 
as one economic unit by sharing or pooling all income.181  Her conclusion, based upon 
her own empirical study and the work of several others, was that not all married couples 
pool their assets and the pooling of assets is not confined to married couples.182  She 
further concluded that even among those couples who profess to pool assets, “in reality 
the nonearner spouse often does not have equal access to assets; instead the earner 
controls the money.”183  She concludes, as I do, that the joint return should be 
abolished.184 
In the nearly twenty years since Kornhauser’s article, the divorce rate has held 
steady but the percentage of unmarried cohabitating couples has risen.  A recent Pew 
Research Center analysis of census data revealed that only 51% of adults in the United 
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States were married in 2010.185  This number represents a record low and a 5% decline in 
new marriages from the prior year.186  In contrast, 72% of all adults were married in the 
year 1960.  While the rate of marriage has dropped, the census data shows that other 
types of households, including cohabiting couples, single-person households, and single-
parent households, have grown in recent decades.  The percentage of divorced or 
separated adults was 14% in 2010; this number has remained somewhat steady in the past 
twenty years, though the number represents a stark contrast to the 5% who were divorced 
in 1960.187  Meanwhile, public opinion about marriage mirrors the decline: 39% of 
Americans surveyed in 2010 answered affirmatively when asked the question, “Is 
marriage becoming obsolete?”188  A greater percentage of young adults (44% of those 
ages 18 to 29) than older adults (32% of those over 65) agreed that marriage is becoming 
obsolete.189  A greater percentage of adults with a high school education or less (45%) 
agreed that marriage is becoming obsolete as compared to those adults with a college 
degree (27% of whom agreed with the statement).190 
The Pew statistics also reveal a greater divergence over time in marital rates 
among those with a high school education or less as compared to those with college 
degrees.191  In 1960, 72% of adults with a high school education or less were married; in 
2010, only 47% of this same demographic was married.192  While the rate of marriage has 
also declined among those with a college degree, the decline is less dramatic: from 76% 
in 1960 to 64% in 2010.193 
Why are these changing demographics of relevance?  One reason, which I 
examine in sub-part V.B, is that married low-income taxpayers are disproportionately 
impacted by their filing status options.  A low-income married couple receives little or no 
benefit from filing jointly as compared to a similarly situated unmarried couple.  At the 
same time, they must accept joint and several liability when they choose this status.  If, 
however, the married couple files separately, there is a punitive outcome: they lose their 
eligibility to claim the earned income credit.   
While this conclusion focuses on the example of low-income taxpayers, there are 
numerous other ways in which changing demographics are rendering the policy 
assumptions of the Code incoherent, and other scholars have argued that the joint return 
should be abolished for different policy reasons.  For example, Lily Kahng cites changing 
demographics and the relative increase in the number of single people in her argument 
that abolishing the joint return is a matter of fairness.194  Anthony Infanti has also 
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proposed mandatory individual filing, citing changing demographics in his argument for 
a more inclusive notion of what constitutes a family.195 
B. Low-Income Households Are Disproportionately Affected by the Filing 
Status Options for Married Persons: Why the Code Should Tax the Type 
of Household, Not the Relationship 
 Part III examined the historical rationales for joint and several liability.  As the 
Bozick case illustrates, a one-earner married couple with a high income enjoys a 
tremendous benefit from the income splitting a Revisiting the Treasury Department’s 
Recommendation to Expand llowed by the married filing jointly rate structure.  But for 
low-income married couples, the benefits of income splitting are not as measurable.  
Instead it is the eligibility for the earned income credit that is at stake by filing jointly.196  
Even if one agrees197 that joint and several liability is an acceptable “price” to pay for the 
benefit of income splitting, one cannot ignore the fact that many low-income taxpayers 
do not enjoy this benefit.  Yet they too are held jointly liable, and as noted previously, 
low-income taxpayers are the most likely to request innocent spouse relief.198 
 As an illustration of this problem, consider the following four scenarios, each 
involving the same facts: a married couple has two minor children; they live together all 
year, which means they must file either a joint return or married filing separately.  The 
Code does not permit them to file as single.  Assume that in tax year 2010,199 the husband 
earned $25,000.  The wife, who worked only part-time, earned $8,000.  Both taxpayers 
are wage earners.  The following alternative scenarios illustrate how widely the couple’s 
tax situation varies depending on filing status. 
 Scenario 1: If the couple filed “married filing jointly,” the taxpayers would be 
due a refund of $3,897.200   
 Scenario 2: If the couple filed “married filing separately,” with the husband 
claiming the two children as dependents, the result is much different: the husband would 
be entitled to a refund of $1,162,201 while the wife would be due no refund.202   
                                                     
195 Anthony Infanti, Decentralizing Family: An Inclusive Proposal for Individual Tax Filing in the 
United States, 3 UTAH L. REV. 605, 607–08 (2010). 
196 One might wonder why a spouse would be at all concerned with joint and several liability if the 
couple is to receive a large earned income credit.  After all, if the couple will receive a credit, there is no 
liability to attach.  But this is not always the reality.  Consider a husband who works as an independent 
contractor, meaning he is not subject to withholding.  Assume that he and his wife have children, and that his 
wife either does not work or is a wage-earner who is subject to proper withholding.  Without the benefit of 
the earned income credit and the child tax credit (the latter not being contingent on filing jointly), the couple 
would have a significant tax liability due to the husband’s absence of withholding, failure to make estimated 
tax payments, and self-employment tax liability.  Even with the benefits of such credits, the couple may face 
a tax liability, but it would be far smaller.  Thus, the couple is dependent on the earned income credit to 
reduce what would otherwise be a liability that they likely could not afford.   
197 And I do not. 
198 TAS REPORT 2005, supra note 25. 
199 All figures here ignore the Making Work Pay credit, enacted as part of the American Recovery 
and Reinvestment Act of 2009, which provided a refundable credit of up to $400 per working taxpayer in tax 
years 2009 and 2010.  
200 The calculations assumed that neither taxpayer had any federal tax withholdings.  The 
taxpayers’ preliminary joint tax liability of $703 was eliminated by the child tax credit, meaning no tax was 
owed.  The resulting $3,897 refund is attributable to $1,297 for the additional child tax credit and $2,600 for 
the earned income credit. 
201 His preliminary liability of $838 is offset by the child tax credit.  His refund is attributable the 
additional child tax credit of $1,162.  Though he would be income eligible if he were unmarried, he will not 




 As a household unit, the couple has a far less favorable tax outcome with 
“married filing separately” status.  Their aggregate refund is $1,162, which is $2,735 less 
than they received as joint filers.  There are two reasons for this.  The primary reason is 
that taxpayers filing married filing separately are ineligible for the earned income credit, 
regardless of income level.  As joint filers, they received a $2,600 earned income credit 
on their return.  Separately, they receive nothing.  
 A second reason, though far less significant as a dollar amount, is that they lost 
the benefit of income splitting.  Even though both taxpayers are in the ten-percent bracket 
for “married filing separately,” the wife “wastes” part of her personal exemption because 
she only earned $8,000.203  When both spouses aggregated their incomes on a joint return, 
the husband benefited from the portion of her personal exemption that she didn’t need.  
But this example illustrates how insignificant the benefit of income splitting is to a low-
income couple: in this case, the tax savings attributable to income splitting was only 
$135—far less than the amount of the benefit that the earned income credit provided.   
 Put differently, in Scenario 2, the couple suffered the loss of two benefits of joint 
filing—income splitting and the earned income credit—with the loss of the latter costing 
the couple nearly twenty times more in tax savings than the loss of the former.  As 
discussed below, the earned income credit did not exist when Congress considered the 
“benefits” of joint filing status and adopted joint and several liability in 1938; the 
lawmakers were thinking only of the ability for couples to offset one spouse’s losses 
against the other’s income.  Income splitting became a second, justifiable rationale in 
1948 when the new rate schedule for married taxpayers was adopted, creating a marriage 
bonus.  But any marriage bonus today because of income splitting is modest for low-
income taxpayers, and is dwarfed in significance by the earned income credit. 
 Scenario 3:  Suppose there is a couple that is similarly situated to the couple in 
Scenarios 1 and 2, but has decided not to marry.  They live together as committed 
domestic partners and raise their two minor children together.  Their incomes are exactly 
the same as the other couple.  First assume that each individual files as “single,” as they 
are entitled to do, and that the male partner (the higher earner) claimed both children:204 
the male partner would have received a refund of $4,392205 and the female partner would 
have received a refund of $416.206  As a household, the aggregate refund is $4,808, which 
is $911 more than the refund that the married couple filing jointly received in Scenario 1.   
 Why?  As a single filer, each taxpayer is eligible for earned income credit based 
upon their income and without regard to the other taxpayer’s income.  Thus, their total 
earned income credit as two single people is $3,646; as a married couple, it was $2,600.  
The male partner owes slightly more in preliminary tax liability, because he lost the $135 
                                                                                                                                                 
receive any earned income credit because I.R.C. § 32(d) (2012) disallows it for “married filing separately” 
returns. 
202 She has no preliminary liability due to her standard deduction and personal exemption, and she 
will not receive any refundable credits. 
203 Her adjusted gross income was $8,000.  Her standard deduction of $5,700 plus her personal 
exemption of $3,650 equals a total of $9,350.  However, one cannot have a negative taxable income.  Thus, 
she could have earned an additional $1,350 before being subject to any tax liability. 
204 It would be rational for the partners to allocate the children to the higher earner, because the 
lower earner benefits considerably less from the corresponding dependency exemptions and child tax credit. 
205 The male partner’s preliminary liability of $838 would be eliminated by the child tax credit; his 
refund of $4,392 consists of a $3,230 earned income credit and a $1,162 additional child tax credit. 
206 The female partner’s preliminary liability was $0; her refund is attributable to a $416 earned 
income credit. 
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benefit of income splitting; however, the $1,046 increase in their household earned 
income credit well outweighs the household’s $135 tax increase.   
 Why do two unmarried taxpayers sharing a household receive a significantly 
higher earned income credit than a married couple, in a scenario where the household 
income is exactly the same?207  Because the earned income credit is determined by 
income level and filing status, not by household composition.  Thus, in Scenario 3, we 
see a disincentive for low-income taxpayers with children to marry.  In reality, Scenario 4 
illustrates how the unmarried couple will likely attain an even larger household tax 
refund than that shown in Scenario 3. 
 Scenario 4:  If the higher earner of the couple in Scenario 3, in this case the male 
partner, qualifies for “head of household”208 filing status, the father’s refund will be 
$4,662,209 while the female partner’s refund remains $416.  In the aggregate, the couple 
receives a refund of $5,078, which is $1,181 more than a similarly situated married 
couple would receive. 
 The wildly disparate results shown in Scenarios 1 to 4 show that, under these 
facts, the hypothetical couple is better off from an income tax perspective if they are 
unmarried rather than married.  If unmarried, they will avoid the pitfalls of joint and 
several liability.  But if married, they cannot do so without being further penalized if they 
elect separate filing status.  It does not make sense to incentivize a married couple to file 
jointly (thus introducing a potential risk to the “innocent spouse”) while allowing a 
similarly situated unmarried couple to avoid joint liability yet receive higher refunds.   
 This is one of many reasons for which I conclude that Congress must move 
beyond joint and several liability and joint filing.  Both the country and the tax code have 
changed considerably since 1938, and it is time to revisit the suitability of this structure.   
                                                     
207 Note that this is not this is not always the case: as the earned income credit phases out according 
to adjusted gross income, it phases out at a lower adjusted gross income level for unmarried filers than for 
married filing jointly.  For example, in 2010, a head of household filer with two children and an adjusted 
gross income of $42,000 will receive no earned income credit, while a married filing jointly couple with two 
children and a combined adjusted gross income of $42,000 will receive a $705 earned income credit.  The 
married filing jointly couple will receive no earned income credit once their adjusted gross income reaches 
$45,373. 
208 See I.R.C. § 2(b) (2012).  The father will be eligible because he is unmarried, maintains a 
household with a qualifying child, and furnishes more than half the cost of maintaining the household.  The 
head of household status was enacted in 1951 as a way to extend tax relief to single persons with dependents: 
“The income of a head of household who must maintain a home for a child, for example, is likely to be 
shared with the child to the extent necessary to maintain the home, and raise and educate the child.  This, it is 
believed, justifies the extension of some of the benefits of income splitting.  The hardship appears particularly 
severe in the case of the individual with children to raise who, upon the death of his spouse, finds himself in 
the position not only of being denied the spouse’s aid in raising the children, but under present law also may 
find his tax load heavier.”  H.R. REP. No. 82-586, at 11 (1951).  Extrapolating from this Congressional intent, 
it is somewhat illogical then that a two-income unmarried couple raising children together should benefit 
from a provision intended for single parents.  But there is no provision limiting the status to those who 
maintain a household without support from another adult.  This is a further and arguably more egregious 
example of the “unmarriage bonus” and a result that flies in the face of the policy intended by Congress. 
209 The father’s rate remains the same regardless of filing status, but the standard deduction for 
“head of household” in 2010 was $8,400, while the standard deduction for “single” was only $5,700.  Thus, 
his taxable income is $2,700 less in Scenario 4 than in Scenario 3.  In turn, this lower taxable income reduces 
his preliminary tax liability by $270, which creates a corresponding $270 increase in his refundable 
additional child tax credit.  The father’s preliminary tax of $568 is eliminated by the child tax credit, and his 
$4,662 refund consists of a $3,230 earned income credit and a $1,432 additional child tax credit.   




1. Isolating the Impact of the Earned Income Credit in the Low-
Income Context 
 Scenarios 1 to 4 highlight some disturbing inconsistencies with the intended tax 
policy, all stemming from the complexity and the value of the refundable earned income 
credit in its current incarnation.  First, why should taxpayers be ineligible for the earned 
income credit merely because they file separately, if they would meet the income limits 
for eligibility as a couple?  If the couple wishes to preserve separate liability, so as to 
avoid the types of legal difficulties that arise under joint and several liability, then they 
must forsake their earned income credit eligibility.210  Second, why should an unmarried 
couple living together receive a higher total earned income credit than a similarly situated 
married couple?  A couple sharing household expenses will face the same household 
costs irrespective of marital status, but the unmarried couple benefits more in this case.  
This scenario demonstrates a financial disincentive for the couple to marry.  One reason 
for these inconsistencies in tax policy is that the earned income credit was introduced 
decades after joint and several liability, and the original purpose and scope of the earned 
income credit were quite different than what the program accomplishes today. 
 The earned income credit was first introduced in the Tax Reduction Act of 1975, 
which was a temporary stimulus measure enacted to address the weak economy and high 
unemployment at the time.211  The earned income credit itself was to be temporary: as 
originally enacted, it was effective only for tax year 1975.212  The legislative history 
describes the credit as appearing to have the same two objectives as the work bonus plan 
that had been proposed several times and not passed: (1) “as a way of decreasing work 
disincentives” for persons on welfare; and (2) as a way of addressing the regressive 
nature of social security taxes.213  The maximum earned income credit available in 1975 
was $400, and it was available only to low-income taxpayers (both unmarried and 
married) with a dependent child in their household.214  The credit began to phase out if 
the taxpayer’s adjusted gross income exceeded $4,000, and a taxpayer with an adjusted 
gross income of $8,000 or more would receive no credit at all.  As is still the case today, 
                                                     
210 In the case of a married couple, both spouses’ incomes must be considered when determining 
earned income credit eligibility.  If, however, the spouses’ aggregate income is within the income limits, it 
does not seem fair to deny both spouses the earned income credit for filing separately.  However, a problem 
may arise later if one spouse is determined to have understated his or her income.  If in fact the husband 
earned not $25,000 but $50,000, then neither spouse should be eligible under current law.  If married 
taxpayers filing separately were allowed the earned income credit, but were later ineligible due to 
underreporting by one spouse, it would affect both spouses’ earned income credit eligibility.  Should the 
underreporting spouse bear the sole responsibility, including the liability arising from the other spouse’s 
incorrect receipt of the earned income credit? 
211 See generally H.R. REP. NO. 94-19 (1975). 
212 Tax Reduction Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-12, § 209(b), 89 Stat. 26, 35.   
213 JOINT COMM. ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAX’N, 94TH CONG., ANALYSIS OF THE HOUSE VERSION OF THE TAX 
REDUCTION ACT OF 1975 (H.R. 2166) AND POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES 33 (Comm. Print 1975).  See also S. REP. 
NO. 94-36, at 11 (1975) (elaborating on the earned income credit as follows: “This new refundable credit will 
provide relief to families who currently pay little or no income tax.  These people have been hurt the most by 
rising food and energy costs.  Also, in almost all cases, they are subject to the social security payroll tax on 
their earnings.  Because it will increase their after-tax earnings, the new credit, in effect, provides an added 
bonus or incentive for low-income people to work, and therefore, should be of importance in inducing 
individuals with families receiving Federal assistance to support themselves.  Moreover, the refundable credit 
is expected to be effective in stimulating the economy because the low-income people are expected to spend 
a large fraction of their increased disposable incomes.”). 
214 Tax Reduction Act of 1975 § 204.  As originally enacted, it appeared in § 43 of the Code.  The 
earned income credit is currently found in I.R.C. § 32 (2012). 
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the credit as originally introduced was available to a married couple only if a joint return 
was filed; a couple filing separately could not receive the credit.215 
 The earned income credit, of course, was extended beyond the 1975 tax year and 
has been expanded repeatedly over the years.  Today it holds an incredibly significant 
benefit for low-income taxpayers.  Unlike in 1975, it is currently available even to certain 
low-income taxpayers who do not have children.  The credit is calculated based on 
income and phases out at different maximum income levels that vary depending on 
whether a taxpayer is unmarried or married filing jointly; the phase-out levels increase 
according to whether the taxpayer has no children, one child, two children, or three or 
more children.216  The amount of the maximum credit increases in the same manner.  For 
example: in 2010, a taxpayer with no qualifying children is eligible to receive a 
maximum credit of $457, and the credit phases out to zero if the taxpayer’s adjusted gross 
income is $13,460 or more (or $18,470 if married filing jointly).  A taxpayer with one 
qualifying child can receive up to $3,050, but will receive nothing if the taxpayer’s 
adjusted gross income is $35,535 or more (or $40,545 if married filing jointly).  A 
taxpayer with two qualifying children can receive up to $5,036, but the credit phases out 
to zero at an adjusted gross income of $40,363 (or $45,373 if married filing jointly).  
Finally, a taxpayer with three or more qualifying children might receive up to $5,666, 
with the credit phasing out to zero at an adjusted gross income of $43,352 (or $48,362 if 
married filing jointly). 
 There is evidence that the earned income credit not only lifts families out of 
poverty but benefits children in more meaningful ways.217  For example, a recent study 
by Gordon Dahl and Lance Lochner estimated the impact of the increase in family 
income due to expansions in the earned income credit program.218  Dahl and Lochner 
concluded that their data indicated “modest but encouraging effects of family income on 
children’s scholastic achievement.”219  If one accepts this conclusion as an influencing 
                                                     
215 I.R.C. § 32(d) (2012).  The legislative history does not provide a clear rationale for denying a 
credit to married couples filing separately.  One possibility is that Congress wanted to keep the credit simple 
to administer.  H.R. REP. NO. 94-19, at 30–31 (1975) provides: “The credit is to be calculated on a return-by-
return basis.  Individuals who are married and filing a joint return are eligible for only one credit on the 
combined income of both individuals.  Married individuals filing separate returns are not eligible for the 
credit.”  The Senate Report 94-36 contains nearly identical language with no further elaboration.  S. REP. NO. 
94-36, at 35 (1975). 
216 The provision that increased the earned income credit for a taxpayer with three or more children 
was enacted as part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 
115.  It was intended as a temporary measure only for tax years 2009 and 2010; however, it was extended 
through 2012 by the Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization and Job Creation Act of 2010, 
Pub. L. No. 111-312, 124 Stat. 3296. 
217 JIMMY CHARITE, INDIVAR DUTTA-GUPTA & CHUCK MARR, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY 
PRIORITIES, STUDIES SHOW EARNED INCOME CREDIT ENCOURAGES WORK AND SUCCESS IN SCHOOL AND 
REDUCES POVERTY (2012) available at http://www.cbpp.org/files/6-26-12tax.pdf. 
218 GORDON B. DAHL & LANCE LOCHNER, NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH, THE IMPACT OF 
FAMILY INCOME ON CHILD ACHIEVEMENT: EVIDENCE FROM THE EARNED INCOME CREDIT (2011) available at 
http://dss.ucsd.edu/~gdahl/papers/children-and-EITC.pdf.  The authors conclude from their baseline estimates 
that a $1,000 increase in income raises a child’s contemporaneous math and reading test scores by 6% of a 
standard deviation.  They conclude that their estimates “suggest that the effects are larger for children 
growing up in more disadvantaged families, younger children, and boys.”  Id. at 1951.  See also CHARITE, 
DUTTA-GUPTA & MARR, supra note 217, at 2, 8–10 (citing a number of different studies in support of the 
report’s statement that “[a] small but growing body of research indicates that lifting the incomes of low-
income families helps children in those families do better in school” and is “associated with a significant 
increase in the child’s earnings in adulthood.”). 
219 DAHL & LOCHNER, supra note 218, at 1949. 




consideration of tax policy, then it is even more nonsensical to link eligibility for the 
earned income credit to joint and several liability.   
2. Isolating the Impact of the Marriage Bonus in the Low-Income 
Context 
Ignoring the impact of the earned income credit, the marriage bonus is far less 
pronounced for low-income taxpayers, especially those who can claim exemptions for 
one or more dependent children, because their rates are relatively low compared to those 
of high-income taxpayers.  Yet there are scenarios in which the marriage bonus exists for 
low-income couples, so it should also be examined as a “privilege” of filing jointly in this 
context.  If Congress moved to individual filing, low-income taxpayers would stand to 
lose whatever marriage bonus attributable to income splitting they now enjoy. 
The most noticeable marriage bonus would result in a one-earner household with 
no children.220  Staying within the context of low-income earners, imagine that one 
spouse earned $40,000 and the second spouse earned no income: the marriage bonus 
would be $1,822, all of which is attributable to income splitting and the extra personal 
exemption (a childless couple will receive no earned income credit at this income level).  
This amount is a significant sum for a couple with a household income of only $40,000.  
However, it is questionable as a matter of tax policy whether the Code should incentivize 
a one-earner household when there are no children.  This scenario lacks the obvious 
compelling factor, namely child rearing, to justify the second earner’s lack of 
participation in the labor market.  Meanwhile, the non-earner is left financially vulnerable 
in the event of divorce or the earner’s death.  If Congress moved to mandatory separate 
filing, this couple would lose the $1,822 benefit of income splitting, but the non-earner 
would not bear the risk of an unforeseen individual tax liability.  Additionally, the Code 
would no longer provide a disincentive (real or perceived) for the non-earner to enter the 
labor force by virtue of marital status.221 
The marriage bonus is less pronounced if the same couple has two children, such 
that one spouse earns $40,000 and the second spouse earns no income because he or she 
has elected to stay at home with their small children.  In that case, the amount of the 
marriage bonus attributable to income splitting and the second spouse’s personal 
exemption is $1,101 as compared to an unmarried person filing as head of household.222  
Again, while a high-income one-earner couple would receive a far greater marriage 
bonus, $1,101 is not an insignificant sum for a low-income couple.  Ironically, if the 
second spouse in this example were to work part-time and earn as little as $6,000, the 
couple would completely phase out of earned income credit eligibility.  Thus, there are 
                                                     
220 The absence of children means that the couple will not reduce its liability through dependency 
exemptions, thus the marriage bonus is more pronounced. 
221 One could argue that the very existence of an income tax is a disincentive to work.  I do not 
accept this argument, but I do accept the argument that income splitting currently provides a rational 
incentive for one spouse to work less or not at all, because the additional income negates the marriage bonus 
as it increases.  Separate filing would place all individuals in similar situations with respect to income and tax 
liability, because the existence of the additional income would not impact the liability of a spouse.  
222 I have purposely ignored the earned income credit in this calculation so as to make a comparison 
only of the benefits of income splitting in this case.  If the marriage bonus is calculated as including the 
earned income credit, then the bonus is $2,156, because the married couple filing jointly would receive an 
earned income credit of $1,126 while the unmarried filer would receive a credit of only $71.  This is due to 
the fact that the income phase out for the credit is higher for married taxpayers.  However, if both couples 
earned $50,000, or if both couples earned $40,000 but had no children, then neither couple would be eligible 
for the earned income credit.   
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two separate tax disincentives for the second spouse to stay out of the work force in this 
hypothetical. 
In any event, the calculus regarding a marriage bonus as a disincentive to work is 
far more complex when small children are present, because the couple will incur day care 
costs if the second spouse enters the work force; the second earner will have to earn a 
certain minimum amount to offset those costs, while simultaneously reducing the 
marriage bonus (and the earned income credit) with his or her earnings.  Thus, it is often 
not rational for low-income families with children to follow the two-earner model.  
However, there are other ways to address the costs of raising children, whether those 
costs are borne as day care expenses or the opportunity cost of the second earner staying 
home.   
C. A Brief Consideration of How to Restructure the Earned Income Credit 
in an Individual Filing System 
If Congress mandated individual filing, it would have to decide how to structure 
the credits currently available to households headed by married couples.  One specific 
question is whether Congress would aggregate the spouse’s separate income for purposes 
of determining the earned income credit.  As noted above, it does not now do so for 
cohabiting couples.  Should married couples be treated differently?  If one does not 
accept the premise of marriage as an economic unit, then arguably the Code should not 
aggregate the spouses’ incomes.  Zelenak examined the pros and cons of this question in 
his 1994 article, noting that: 
If a wife of a high income husband earns a few thousand dollars . . . [t]he 
premises of separate returns—marriage neutrality and the independent 
economic identities of spouses—indicate that she should be eligible for 
the credit.  But the credit is intended to help the poor, and she is not 
poor.223  
It is true that she is not poor, but Congress should not ignore the fact that many 
marriages end in divorce,224 and she may be better positioned to support herself after a 
divorce if she maintains a presence in the work force throughout her marriage.  
Furthermore, if her high-earning spouse claimed the children as dependents on his return, 
as he is likely to do, then her separate entitlement to an earned income credit would be 
nominal.225 
Zelenak suggested that, were Congress to adopt mandatory individual filing, a 
better alternative to retaining the current earned income credit system would be to 
                                                     
223 Zelenak, supra note 24, at 398–99.  He concludes his article by noting that “[t]here is no 
absolutely right or wrong way to tax married couples . . . .  Whatever the merits of joint returns may have 
been for mid-twentieth century America, the joint-return system fits poorly with American attitudes and 
living patterns at the close of the century.”).  Id. at 404–05. 
224 PEW RESEARCH CTR., THE DECLINE OF MARRIAGE AND RISE OF NEW FAMILIES 38 (2010).  The 
report notes that the divorce rate rose sharply after 1960, peaked in 1979, and has declined since that time.  
The report further suggests that the decline in the divorce rate reflects the simultaneous decline in marriage.  
Id. 
225 Each child would allow the husband a dependency exemption of $3,700 in 2011.  Depending on 
the husband’s income, he may also be eligible for a child tax credit of up to $1,000 in 2011.  The wife 
earning a few thousand dollars, on the other hand, would have no tax liability and would not earn enough to 
receive any portion of the child tax credit.  Without qualifying children to claim, her earned income credit 
could not exceed $464 and might be less; it would roughly offset her FICA taxes, which was the original 
legislative intent of the earned income credit. 




redesign the credit.226  As Zelenak notes, George Yin and Jonathan Barry Forman 
proposed a family-based credit that could work well in a separate return system.227  Yin 
and Forman contemplated a two-pronged program: an exemption from Social Security 
taxes for the working poor, and a refundable credit for low-income taxpayers based on 
the number of children in the home.228   
If Congress desires a substantial subsidy for low-income households with 
children as a matter of tax policy, as the current Code supports through refundable 
credits, it seems reasonable to believe that such a credit could be completely 
disaggregated from filing status.  A married couple should not benefit less from such a 
subsidy than a cohabiting couple, and a wife should not bear the risk of being held 
responsible for her husband’s tax shortcomings in a program designed to benefit her 
children. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
When the Senate Finance Committee held its Restructuring Hearings in 1998, 
Senator William Roth opened the discussion on innocent spouse tax rules by highlighting 
the plight of the low-income ex-wife who was struggling to make it as a single parent:  
Financially insecure, many times struggling as a single parent to raise 
children, working for an income that is a fraction of what her ex-spouse 
earns, now she has to confront the often unrelenting Internal Revenue 
Service.  In an effort to acquire revenues owed, the agency will pursue 
these women with a vengeance.  It will garnish wages, place liens against 
homes, and often jeopardize future relationships because a new person in 
her life might well be held accountable for her former spouse’s tax 
problems.229 
Despite the extensive legislative reform that followed these hearings in 1998 and 
years of further statutory, judicial, and administrative liberalization of the innocent 
spouse rules, joint liability continues to adversely impact low-income women.  Rather 
than continuing to expand the grounds and factors for relief, subjecting these women to 
an invasive relief process that takes many months if not years to resolve, Congress should 
revisit its antiquated assumptions about joint filing and move to mandatory individual 
filing. 
While this will create ripple effects throughout the Code,230 it is also an 
opportunity to move towards simplification and to update the Code in light of the 
changing demographic realities of the United States.  
Bearing in mind the continued decline of marriage rates (which is most 
pronounced among the least educated)231 and the potential impact of family income on a 
                                                     
226 Zelenak, supra note 24, at 400–01. 
227 See George K. Yin & Jonathan Barry Forman, Redesigning the Earned Income Tax Credit 
Program to Provide More Effective Assistance for the Working Poor, 59 TAX NOTES 951 (1993). 
228 Id. at 957–60.  
229
 IRS Restructuring: Hearings on H.R. 2676 Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 105th Cong. 142 
(1998).  
230 Many Code sections provide special benefits for married couples filing jointly and would need 
to be amended accordingly.  See, e.g., I.R.C. § 121(b)(2) (2012) (providing special rules for joint filers who 
wish to claim the exclusion on gain from the sale of a principal residence).  
231 PEW RESEARCH CTR., supra note 224, at 11 (reporting a gap of sixteen percentage points in 2008 
in marriage rates between college graduates (64%) and those with a high school diploma or less (48%)).  
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child,232 it is harmful tax policy to condition a married couple’s eligibility for the earned 
income credit on the acceptance of joint and several liability while asking a divorcée to 
turn to an inefficient relief process if the marriage ends.  The better answer is to stop 
penalizing the innocent spouse, embrace demographic reality, and simplify the filing 
status structure by mandating individual filing. 
                                                     
232 See supra notes 217–19. 
